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Abstract
The paper provides an up-to-date review of the literature on the patterns and drivers of rural migration in 
sub-Saharan Africa and explores their relation to rural and structural transformation, with the objective 
of feeding the current policy debate on migration. Based on a mixed approach that combines a critical 
literature review of past, current and future drivers of migration and analyses of available data, the paper 
first elaborates a pluri-disciplinary and comprehensive conceptual framework for the understanding 
of the drivers and patterns of rural migration. It then examines the evolving patterns of African rural 
migration and presents renewed migration characteristics, which have emerged over the last decades. 
Beyond the classical one-way rural-urban migration, contemporary African migration is characterized by 
widespread multi-directional (including rural-to-rural and urban-to-rural), more complex and step-wise 
movements with forms of circular migration. It results in double-way and continuous relations of rural 
migrants with their areas of origin. These patterns support socio-economic linkages within and across 
space and sectors, which challenge the conventional knowledge on the processes of rural change. They 
reveal that migration is performing a range of socio-economic functions far beyond the only transfer of 
labour from agriculture to other sectors and from rural-to-urban areas. As such, they highlight possible 
new structural transformation paths, responding to existing challenges faced by the region in terms of 
demographic and economic transition. The paper finally discusses the characteristics and dynamics of 
the drivers using existing datasets and case studies. It highlights the diverse and multifaceted anture 
of the drivers of rural migration and the way they act in combination to shape African rural migration 
dynamics and their links to contemporary regional and sectoral dynamics.

1Introduction 
This working paper is a companion of the FAO−CIRAD atlas on rural migration in sub−Saharan Africa: 
Rural Africa in motion. Dynamics and drivers of migration South of the Sahara, published respectively in 
2017 and 2018 for the English and French versions (Mercandalli and Losch, eds., 2017, 2018). Despite 
a delayed publication, it was drafted in parallel to the preparation of the atlas and both documents 
benefited from cross−fertilization between literature review, data mining, case studies and the process 
of designing illustrations for the two−page thematic and country case spreads of the atlas. 
In spite of headlines, migration is not a new phenomenon. It is rooted in world’s history, and movements 
between and across continents and regions spread long before the general development of nation−states. 
It is fully part of the permanent process of change of every society and it has always been an inherent 
contributor − and result − of structural transformation. The progressive shift of humankind from rural 
societies to cities has been fueled by a continuous process of rural−urban migration which accelerated 
over the last two centuries and developed worldwide. 
Sub−Saharan Africa (SSA) is no exception. It has a long history of internal and international migration, 
by choice or by constraint, and movement of people deeply shaped the region. According to available 
statistics, about 33 million Africans were living outside their country of nationality in 2015. It represents 
2.8 percent of the total population of the continent and only 14 percent of international migrants 
worldwide (UNDESA, 2015). 
However, migration in sub-Saharan Africa is specific. Contrary to North Africa where the great majority 
of migrants cross the continental borders to reach Europe, people in SSA tend to move mostly to 
neighbouring countries or within the region. Out of 23 million SSA’s international migrants, 70 percent 
(16 million) stay in the region.1
This reality of international migration is underestimated due to the importance of undocumented migrants 
across borders. However, the focus on international movement of people masks the massive internal 
migration, within countries, – for which accurate information is even more scarce − and estimated 
globally to be six times greater than international migration.
The bulk of internal migration corresponds to rural−urban migration flows which are central in the 
historical process of change. In this working paper, rural migration (or rural−out migration) is defined 
in a broad way as any spatial movement of people from rural areas to urban or other rural areas, within 
or between countries, for social, economic, political and environmental reasons, and implying or not a 
change of residence, on short term or long−term bases. 
Together with urbanization, rural migration continues to fuel African structural transformation. However, 
due to the characteristics of the demographic and economic transition in SSA, with a booming population 
and limited economic opportunities in cities (compared to past transitions in other regions), migration 
patterns have evolved. They also have significantly affected the characteristics of rural−urban dynamics 
and their role in economic transition.
Indeed, sub−Saharan migration presents a diversified picture in terms of mobility patterns and 
destinations at both internal and international levels. In particular, the dynamics of circular or non−
residential migration, between and within countries, are a direct answer to the challenges faced by rural 
households.
1 UNDESA released new data on migrant stocks in 2019 after the preparation of this working paper and the publication of the atlas. 
The new estimates indicate 40.2 million African migrants, which corresponds to a limited increase of 7 million and to the same share 
of international migrants (14.8 percent) compared to the data used in this working paper from 2015. In particular, 28 million African 
migrants are from sub-Saharan Africa and 65 percent of them migrate within the region (UNDESA, 2019).  
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They result in growing multi−local and multi−active household strategies which are a renewed component 
of the structural transformation process. Because they contribute to strengthening a variety of socio−
economic and spatial linkages, they support the development of new territorial dynamics rooted in a 
deeper rural−urban interface, which is reshaping the processes of change. 
Yet, despite their critical role in local and national development, such migration dynamics remain broadly 
unknown and their positive contribution to structural transformation is rarely acknowledged. This is why it 
is key to unravel the migration mechanisms at play and to identify their different drivers − as factors that 
induce, orient and sustain migration – in spite of a variety of contexts. 
As such, the objective of this working paper – which does not address the specific case of forced 
displacement − is to offer a review and a better understanding of the diverse and multifaceted drivers 
of rural migration. It is also to explore the way they act in combination to shape the current migration 
patterns, and to investigate their contribution to contemporary spatial and sectoral dynamics and to 
structural transformation. 
In addition to reviewing the existing knowledge base, the document provides a synthesis of rural 
migration dynamics and offers a comprehensive approach on the drivers and determinants of migration, 
in perspective with the process of structural transformation in sub−Saharan Africa. It aims at informing 
policy design for a better articulation of migration realities to public action. 
The document, first, proposes a discussion of rural migration as part of the structural transformation 
process in SSA, and its relation to the development debate. Then, the methodological choices combining 
literature review and data analysis are presented (section 1). This mixed approach is used to propose a 
conceptual framework based on a critical literature review of past, current and future drivers of migration 
(section 2), before examining the evolving patterns of African rural migration (section 3). The paper finally 
discusses drivers’ characteristics and dynamics using existing datasets and case studies (section 4). 
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1. Framing the study: rural migration drivers and structural 
transformation in sub−Saharan Africa
Migration is a key component of the structural transformation process taking place in Africa. It plays a 
critical role in national and sub−national development and is an important response to major challenges 
faced by the continent, like youth unemployment and environmental and social sustainability. 
As such, rural migration dynamics require due attention. The section reminds the place of migration in 
development processes and why it needs to be reconsidered (1.1). Then, it presents the methodology 
adopted in the working paper in order to address existing data and conceptual limitations and to 
comprehensively explore the drivers and patterns of rural migration. It advocates for adopting a mixed 
approach based on quantitative and qualitative methods (1.2).
1.1 Why is understanding rural migration in Africa important?
1.1.1 Old processes but new context and patterns
Rural migration is fully part of structural transformation, which refers to changes overtime in the sectoral 
and spatial distribution of economic activities and people. A stylized summary of this process and its 
main determinants show the gradual transition from an agriculture−based economy to one based initially 
on industry and then on services, in conjunction with urbanization and a geographic population shift from 
rural to urban areas. 
This transition results from major technological changes supported by the adoption of fossil fuels which 
led to impressive productivity gains facilitating the transfer of labour and capital from agriculture to other 
economic activities. This process was accompanied by a progressive spatial restructuring from scattered 
activities (agriculture) to more concentrated ones (industry), and a migration of labour and people from 
rural areas to cities unlocked by huge progresses in transport and communication.
Structural transformation occurred and continues at different paces and according to regional 
characteristics. Its general pattern, which is supported by statistical evidence (Johnston and Kilby, 1975), 
was observed first in Western Europe in the late eighteenth century with the agricultural and industrial 
revolutions; it then reached its major offshoots,2  Eastern Europe and Japan in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and developed next in other regions, albeit more unevenly, mainly after the Second 
World War. 
In this process, Europe benefited immensely from its military and political hegemony, which gave it 
access to settler colonies and captive markets with little competition. Asia and Latin America (with many 
variations) were able to rely on vigorous state−led modernization policies (Giraud, 1996), which continued 
until the late 1970s corresponding to the economic liberalization of the world economy and the beginning 
of globalization (Amsden, 2001). 
Sub−Saharan Africa did not benefit from the same historical sequence, which explains why the sub−
continent lags behind with regard to its structural transformation. New African states only and mostly 
gained their independence from the 1960s, inheriting the former colonial borders with poor infrastructure 
and skilled human resources. 
2 The United States of America and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and other countries such as Argentina with significant 
European settlements.
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They all had to adopt very restrictive structural adjustment reforms after two decades, or less, of partially 
autonomous public policies, and they engaged in globalization under very asymmetric conditions with 
regard to other regions and competitors. 
These intertwined factors explain why SSA is characterized by the importance of its primary sector 
(extractive industries and agriculture), the relative importance of its rural population, and a unique 
urbanization process without industrialization (Losch et al., 2012). 
With regard to the role of international migration in the transformation processes, Europe was characterized 
by a massive migration of about 60 million people to other continents. It facilitated the absorption of labour 
surpluses exiting agriculture and facing limited opportunities in the context of early industrialisation (Hatton 
and Williamson, 2005). Such migration was not replicated in other regions due to geopolitical position of 
Europe till after the Second World War. Chinese and Indian diasporas, migrants from South Asia and the 
Philippines to the Gulf countries, from North Africa to Western Europe, from Mexico and Central America 
to the United States, have all played a significant role in their respective countries, but a process of the 
magnitude of European migration cannot anymore take place.3 In the current geopolitical order of partial 
globalization, borders are mostly closed to people, with hardening of controls, although largely open to 
capital, goods and many services. Yet, if borders were open, people would certainly move (Pritchett, 2006). 
With regard to the role of internal migration, the traditional rural−urban intersectorial transfer of labour 
fuelled most of structural transformation processes (Fei and Ranis, 1964). The structural characteristics 
of SSA, with limited industrialization and a major development of the informal sector (less lucrative and 
more vulnerable than waged labour), prevent rural to urban migration to perform the same historical role 
(de Brauw et al., 2014). 
New pathways are developing, with new migration dynamics between rural and urban areas, within 
and between African countries. They are playing an under−acknowledged role in the African structural 
transformation process (Suttie and Vargas Lindus, 2016; CNUCED, 2018; FAO, 2018). Rural−urban 
migration remains a prominent feature but it actually coexists with rural−rural or urban−rural migration, 
either short or long term, as well as growing circular movements consisting in recurrent migration between 
a place of origin and one or more places of destination, both at internal and continental levels. 
The greater diversity of African migration patterns is also due to the presence of gradually more connected 
societies and growing population densities (a process also observed elsewhere). Rural migration is central 
to rural−urban linkages (Evans, 1990) and contributes to the spatial and sectoral restructuring through 
new connections between rural and urban spaces. First, rural households diversify their employment and 
income strategies engaging in a multiple range of non−farm activities that used to be part of the urban 
domain (Bryceson, 2002). Accordingly, many households are multi−sited:  their members live or work across 
the urban−rural divide (Tacoli, 2002; Losch, 2015). Last, cultural references and practices in rural areas are 
also changing, due to improved transportation networks, and the spread of communication means such as 
mobile phones, internet, and television. This contributes to the narrowing of the rural−urban divide and the 
rising of new territorial dynamics illustrated by the increasingly interlocked nature of rural and urban spaces 
resulting from an urbanization from below, with rural boroughs rapidly becoming rural towns connected by 
growing small settlements (Losch and Magrin, 2016). 
This process takes particularly place in the spreading rural−urban interface where provincial cities and 
small towns already account for more than the 20 percent of the total African population (Berdegué and 
Proctor, 2014). These socio−spatial arrangements embodied in rural urban spaces affect an increasing 
share of the rural population. The resulting emerging functional territories correspond to a new socio−
economic system based on interconnectivity and permanent flows of people, goods, services, and capital. 
3 The estimated migration of 60 million Europeans between 1850 and 1930 (major uncertainties remain between migrant stocks and 
flux due to migrants’ return to their home country) as to be compared to the European population which grew from 210 million to 365 
million over the period (Maddison, 2010). In order to grasp the magnitude of the process, it corresponds to about 20 percent of the 
European population at this time.
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They share deeply entrenched informal and progressively formal institutions that are shaping social 
and economic life, as well as the way these territories connect and interact with the broader forces and 
trends of national development (Berdegué and Proctor, 2014a). These territorial dynamics facilitate rural 
transformation. 
Contrary to urban concentration which can perpetuate rural marginalisation, a smoother and less asymmetric 
urbanization linkages are easier between these smaller urban centres and their rural hinterlands, where the 
majority of the poor live (Christiaensen and Todo, 2014; Losch et al., 2015; Akkoyunlu, 2013; Steel et al., 
2019).
1.1.2 Migration drivers, transformation and the development debate
The drivers of migration are generally described as factors or forces − internal or external to the household 
− that influence decisions to migrate as well as the patterns of migration.4 
The literature on the topic stresses the limited understanding of the mechanisms driving migration, and 
particularly the one originating from rural areas. Over the last decades, theoretical research on the nature 
and causes of migration processes did not advance much (Arango, 2000; Bakewell, 2010): progresses in 
research on migration drivers are constrained by data issues and division between economics and other 
social sciences, as well as between qualitative and quantitative approaches (Boswell, 2008; de Haas 
2011b). As a result, “although there is consensus that macro−contextual economic and political factors 
and meso−level factors, such as networks, all play some role [in starting or sustaining migration], there is 
no agreement on their relative weight and mutual interaction” (de Haas, 2011b). 
Yet, considering the role of rural migration in SSA’s transformation, it is important to unravel the 
mechanisms at stake in the migration process, identifying different drivers, their significance and 
combination, as well as the variety of socioeconomic and spatial linkages and spatial transformation they 
support, in spite of a variety of contexts. 
Rural−urban linkages have been a core issue in theoretical and policy debate, particularly since Lewis 
(1954) developed his dual sector model. In earlier days of development economics, building linkages 
between rural and urban economies was a matter of policy choice: in Lewis’ approach it was about 
fostering urbanization and industrialization at the cost of rural societies and agriculture (Berdegué and 
Proctor, 2014a). After a long eclipse when sectorial approaches to development prevailed, the importance 
of rural−urban linkages for an effective and more balanced territorial development is increasingly 
acknowledged today. 
However, the relation between migration and development remains a difficult one to establish. Indeed, 
despite the increased attention on migration in development studies during the 1990’s, migration still 
tends to be considered as “an isolated, marginal or transitory variable” (de Haan, 2006). Numerous 
empirical studies point that the role of migration in the socio−economic transformation processes is both 
complex and heterogeneous (de Haas, 2010a), and also fully part of the migration − development nexus 
due to their interlinked nature (Nyberg−Sorensen et al., 2002); but the impression is still that of two 
independent phenomena in interaction (Skeldon, 1997, 2008).
Converging with works in other fields of research about the myth of rural immobility (Amselle et al., 1978; 
Le Bris et al., 1985; Skeldon, 1990; Milbourne, 2004), Mc Dowell and de Haan (1997) and de Haan 
(1999), the contention emerges that most of development studies are based on the wrong assumption that 
sedentary pattern within the society are the norm, instead of considering that migration is often the rule 
rather than the exception. These debates are also directly related to the increasing acknowledgement of 
the significance and contribution of population movements to diversified livelihoods (Cramer and Pontara, 
1998; Ellis, 2003; Ellis and Freeman, 2004), and to the insufficient visibility of livelihoods diversification 
in theories of agrarian change (Ellis, 2000).
4 See section 2 for definitions of concepts used in the paper.
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From the unsettled relation between migration and development (Papademetriu and Martin, 1991), the 
debate progressively moved toward a new paradigm where migration is considered as “a process which is 
an integral part of broader transformation processes embodied in the term ‘development’; but also has its 
internal, self−sustaining and self−undermining dynamics; and impacts on such transformation processes 
in its own right” (de Haas, 2010a). Research from other disciplines grounded in broader theories of social 
change also support this new approach (Castles, 2008). 
This working paper, by drawing a comprehensive interdisciplinary framework about drivers of rural 
migration, adopts the pluralist approach characterizing this new paradigm (de Haas, 2010a; Skeldon, 2008; 
de Haan, 2006; McDowell and de Haan, 1997; Mercandalli, 2015). It considers that theorising migration as 
part of socioeconomic change is crucial for this field of research. In this perspective, migration is not seen 
as an “exceptional, problematic, and reactive process, but as a complex, patterned, multidimensional, 
and dynamic phenomenon” (de Haas, 2011a). This paradigm change in the understanding of migration 
dynamics gives them a core position in the policy debate and calls for their entire consideration in policy 
design.
1.2 Selected options for investigating rural migration and its 
drivers in sub-Saharan Africa
Facing the difficulty of investigating rural migration in SSA, this working paper rests on a combination of 
literature review and a limited selection of existing datasets. These sources and how they were used are 
presented below.
The geographical scope of the paper is sub−Saharan Africa with a focus on eleven countries in four African 
Union regional economic communities for which available information was supporting a deeper analysis of 
rural migration drivers and patterns (cf. table 1). 
Table 1: Regions and countries included in the study
1.2.1 Review of the literature and qualitative analysis
a. Past and current migration patterns and drivers
The theoretical and empirical literature on drivers and determinants of migration was first reviewed5  and 
critically discussed, stressing the convergence, controversies and limits in existing research, as well as its 
latest development. The specific knowledge about rural migration was particularly addressed. 
5 A preliminary literature review commissioned by FAO was used as an input (Laws and Avis, 2017)
Country/ Region East African 
Community 
(EAC)
Economic 
Community of 
West African 
States (ECOWAS)
Southern African 
Development 
Community 
(SADC)
Common Market 
for Eastern and 
Southern Africa 
(COMESA)
Datasets 
(see section 4.1) Uganda Ghana, Mali, 
Nigeria
Malawi Ethiopia
Case studies
(see section 4.2)
− Senegal
South Africa, 
Zambia, 
Madagascar, 
Mozambique
−
RuRal migRation in sub-sahaRan afRica: 
PatteRns, dRiveRs and Relation to stRuctuRal tRansfoRmation 
8
The conceptual framework on drivers of rural migration resulting from this review (section 2) draws on 
and develops the concept of drivers complexes.
The following review of migration patterns and dynamics (section 3) does not pretend to be exhaustive 
but draws from existing macro data and macro studies at the continental level, and from regional and 
sub−regional studies. Main stylized facts and features of regional migration dynamics are proposed 
adopting a historical perspective.
Country case studies prepared for the atlas on rural migration in SSA were used to illustrate the drivers of 
rural migration (section 4), their different levels (micro, meso, macro) and dimensions (socio economic, 
political, environmental, demographic). Examples of drivers complexes are proposed. In spite of 
incomplete, heterogeneous and limited information derived from these examples, the comparison allows 
for partial conclusion about the nature of drivers’ complexes. 
b. Futures studies on migration patterns and drivers 
Futures studies are “a field of studies, focusing on a methodical exploration of what the future might 
be like” (GFAR, 2014). They include forecast (or projection) defined as “a statement that something is 
going to happen in the future, often based on current knowledge and trends” and foresight (exploration) 
defined as “a systematic, participatory and multi−disciplinary approach to explore mid− to long−term 
futures” (GFAR, 2014). 
The reviewed futures studies were grouped into three categories: forecast/projection, foresight/
exploration and analytical approaches. Forecasting studies intend to predict migration flows and intensity 
based on projections, while foresight studies intend to explore alternative migration flows and intensity 
based on plausible scenarios. Analytical studies have no explicit reference to projections or scenarios, 
but contain elements of analysis related to drivers and determinants of migration. 
A systematic inventory combining sets of keywords was conducted first through a search of major journals 
in the field of futures studies.6  Then, the same sets were used for searching web−based literature sources 
(Scopus, Science direct, Mendeley) for additional articles, books and various reports. Publications before 
2000 were not included in the search. The relevance of all futures studies identified was then assessed 
by the authors using four criteria (highly relevant, relevant, somehow relevant, and slightly/marginally 
relevant).
1.2.2. Data sources and quantitative analysis
a. The data challenge
Accessing relevant data on migration is a major challenge, particularly for rural migration, because 
mobility is most often an obstacle to measurement and statistics.7 Available data for analysing internal 
and international migration, as well as understanding structural transformation, is not consistent and not 
harmonised across countries and regions (FAO, 2018). 
For international migration, the United Nations Population Division (UNDESA) is the major source of 
reference. Its Trends in International Migrant Stock rely on and harmonise data from national population 
censuses to estimate numbers of international migrants. However, census−based data used to assess 
international and also internal migration are often uneven in terms of content and quality and they 
frequently include limited items about migration. This is particularly the case in SSA where the weakness 
of many national statistical systems related to constraints on resources affects the availability and quality 
of data and regular updates (in some countries the last population census was implemented more than 
20 years ago). 
6 The following was used: “migration”  and “scenario” and “Africa”; “migration” and “projection” and “Africa”; “migration” and “future” 
and “Africa”.
7 Annex 1 displays a preliminary assessment of existing data sources on rural migration.
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In addition to difficulties about the estimated numbers of migrants, only a limited number of countries 
have developed specific surveys on migrant households and on the measurement of remittances.8 As 
a result, data on migrants’ characteristics (age, gender, rural/urban location, occupations and skills, 
working conditions and wages, social protection etc.) is very fragmented and prevents aggregation at 
national level and comparison.
Temporary and transit migration is not reported, which explains for instance the lack of information about 
migration from SSA to north Africa. These two types of migration are partly included in informal migration 
data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (IOM, 2008; AfDB, 2014). Short−term (i.e. 
for less than 12 months) and seasonal migration are also difficult to capture. Similarly, statistics on labour 
migration as well as reliable estimates of the economically active migrant population at the regional level 
are lacking, despite efforts by ILO to include labour migration modules in censuses and to implement 
labour force surveys. 
Overall, due to the limitations of census−based data, research on migration mostly relies on indirect 
sources, notably on existing household surveys with thematic focuses − like agriculture or health9 − that 
are not specifically designed to capture migration. The major constraint of these different sources is the 
limited possibility for cross−country analysis due to non−standardized methodology.
b. Data sources used
In this paper, UNDESA is the major source of data on international migrant stocks (UNDESA, 2015) as 
well as for population trends used in the discussion (UNDESA, 2017, 2018).
For microdata, the paper uses the Migration and Remittances Households Surveys (MRHS) and Rural 
Livelihoods Information System (RuLIS). MRHS are single−round, cross−sectional surveys conducted in 
six countries (Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda), coordinated by the World 
Bank and implemented between 2009 and 2010.10 However, the lack of panel data is a major limitation for 
the study of migration dynamics and determinants over time. In addition, some MRHS datasets are only 
representative at the sub−national level,11 even if standardized survey instruments were used across the 
board (Plaza, Navarrete and Ratha, 2011). This limitation prevented national−level comparative analysis. 
Further, a number of agriculture−related important variables, such as farm size or assets, are not captured 
in MRHS surveys. Finally, the absence or scarcity of data on issues such as circular migration or the use 
of remittances for investments (notably in agriculture) prevents an effective understanding of migration 
practices, their impacts and the interrelations between migration and structural transformation in SSA.
This is why specific quantitative analyses (presented in sections 3.2 and 4.1) were based on variables 
and indicators produced by RuLIS, an initiative developed by the FAO Statistics Division in collaboration 
with the World Bank and IFAD and using nationally representative panel household surveys. Starting from 
the recognition that information on rural income and livelihoods are still scarce and sparse, RuLIS puts 
together in a harmonized dataset information on rural incomes, livelihoods and their evolution. Where 
household budget surveys are available, notably the World Bank’s Integrated Survey on Agriculture 
(LSMS−ISA), RuLIS also includes data on the incidence of internal and international migration and the 
economic conditions of households with and without migrants.
C. Statistical analyses based on the Rural Livelihood Information System (RuLIS) 
Bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses were developed for this working paper only using the RuLIS 
datasets. 
8  This is the case of the Migration and Remittances Households Surveys (MRHS). See below.
9 For example, the Health and Demographic Surveillance Systems (HDSS) or the Living Standards Measurement Study – Integrated 
Survey on Agriculture (LSMS−ISA)
10 The South Africa MRHS dataset was not used in this report because it is only representative in two provinces.
11 This is the case for Burkina Faso, Kenya and South Africa
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Aggregating RuLIS and MRHS surveys would have required a considerable investment in time definitely 
beyond the frame of this work and questionable due to the many raw data limitations. 
If RuLIS provides a very useful and unique set of harmonized data, it relies on original raw data sources that 
are heterogeneous in quality and scope. It results in several issues related to missing variables, missing 
values, and sometimes inconsistencies (in variable names, labels and values), which are presented in 
Annex 2. In order to deal with these issues, a significant preparatory work was developed for managing 
the missing values, which were excluded for the statistical work, and for the control of variables before 
their selection under the condition they were available for all the countries.
Table 2 presents the sample size for the six selected countries. Due to data and time limitations, the 
statistical analyses developed in the paper only represent a preliminary stage with successive descriptive 
and inferential statistics for which all tests adopt the 1 percent and 5 percent significance levels. The 
main caveat related to the results is the endogeneity of migration variables (discussed further in sections 
2.1 and 4.1): because the analyses rely on a single wave (year) of surveys, they do not allow to capture the 
direction of causality between migration and the selected variables (Tegegne and Penker, 2016).
Table 2: RuLIS selected countries and survey sample size
Source: FAO − RuLIS
A comparative bivariate descriptive analysis for rural and urban migrant households, as well as for rural 
migrant households (MHHs) and non−migrant households (NMHHs), was first developed in order to 
provide key socio−demographic information on rural out−migrants’ profiles. T−tests and Pearson’s chi−
square were used to identify any significant associations and differences between rural MHH and NMHH 
(David and Gunnink, 1997; Markowski and Markowski, 1990). When Pearson’s chi−square checks 
the existing relation (dependence) between variables, t−tests were implemented to find out whether 
continuous variables as highest years of education, female share of household labour, household size, 
size of land owned, livestock owned and household head age deferred significantly between MHHs and 
NMHHs.
Then, a multivariate analysis on the drivers and patterns of migration was carried using principal 
components analysis (PCA) and a binary logistic regression (BLR). They were used to compare the group 
of MHHs and NMHHs and, subsequently, to discuss the role of a selected number of variables.
PCA is a method for reducing a complex set of possibly correlated variables into a reduced set of principal 
components (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Balen et al., 2010; Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006). Cognizant 
of the complexity or the absence of standardised income and expenditure data across country surveys, 
PCA is often used to generate relative wealth indices using household/individual assets. According to 
Filmer and Pritchett (2001: 128), PCA “provides plausible and defensible weights for an index of assets 
to serve as a proxy for wealth”. For this study, PCA was computed for each of the six countries using 
variables on households’ living conditions: housing features, household ownership of material assets and 
RULIS Country Survey Year Sampled Households
Urban Rural Total
Ethiopia 2015−16 1 682 (34.0%) 3 272 (66.0%) 4 954
Ghana 2013 7 445 (44.4%) 9 327 (55.6%) 16 772
Malawi 2013 1 046 (26.1%) 2 954 (73.9%) 4 000
Mali 2014 1 405 (36.9%) 2 399 (63.1%) 3 804
Nigeria 2012−2013 1 501 (31.3%) 3 299 (68.7%) 4 800
Uganda 2013−2014 816 (26.2%) 2 302 (73.8%) 3 118
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households’ access to basic infrastructure and social services. PCA were carried for two main reasons. 
The first reason was to understand how each of the included variables contributed to household socio−
economic status in its rural context. The second and most important reason was to estimate a relative 
wealth indicator using the first component of the PCA (Balen et al., 2010; Córdova, 2009), and then to 
generate clusters (quintiles) to assess how MHHs and NMHHs compare along each quintile.
The BLR (Agresti, 2002; Hilbe, 2009) was used to model the determinants of rural out−migration for 
each of the six countries, i.e. to assess the predictors of rural out−migration decisions at the level of the 
household. The decision to model rural out−migration using the household as a unit of analysis stems 
from the assumption that family members collectively make migration decisions with the prospective 
individual migrant − an approach which has its roots in the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) 
(Stark, 1991). Consequently, rural households’ migration decision (migrant−household=1, non−migrant 
household=0) was modelled alongside ten explanatory variables reflected in the literature on drivers of 
(rural) migration. Annex 3 presents definitions and measurements of these variables. They are drawn 
from three main domains of household characteristics: demography, human capital and economic well−
being. Traditionally, these variables have been found to be important drivers or determinants of migration 
(Tegegne and Penker, 2016) albeit varying results exist in different contexts. The BLR used for analysing 
the drivers of rural out−migration in this paper is a function of a combination of both push−pull factors. 
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2. Building a conceptual framework on the drivers 
of migration in sub−Saharan Africa
This section presents two core issues about conceptualizing the drivers of migration. The first issue, 
acknowledging that there is a lack of conceptual clarity about determinants and drivers, is a tendency to 
exclusively consider economic factors at the national level as the determinants of migration. The second 
issue is the belief that there is a simple, deterministic mono−causal linear relation between a driver of 
migration and a migration pattern. 
In order to address these issues, after a clarification of the main concepts used in the working paper (2.1), 
a review of the literature on the current drivers of migration (2.2) is associated with a review of futures 
studies (2.3). It highlights the concept of drivers complexes and its relevance for building a conceptual 
framework with an interdisciplinary perspective (2.4).
2.1 Determinants, causes and drivers of migration: a needed 
clarification
In the long−standing research about the explanatory factors of migration, several concepts have been 
used with often unclear and shifting definitions. Determinants, drivers and causes are the most critical:12 
they reflect different approaches, their primacy in the literature has changed overtime, but they are still 
broadly and unduly used indifferently, which calls for a clarification of their definition and usage. 
Determinant seems to remain the dominant concept in most studies. Determinants are the primary factors 
in a broader set of contributing factors of migration. However, there is a very large tendency to conclude 
that all factors of migration are determinants – a consequence of research practice which often focuses on 
specific (isolated) factors. From the literature review, it appears that few researchers look at differentiating 
determinants of migration within a set of drivers. The same occurs with causes of migration.
The reference to causes of migration – which can be defined as factors in the chain of causation that 
directly induce migration − has been declining in academic writing. However, it is notable that the 
notion of root causes (FAO, 2016a) has gained influence in policy circles. Indeed, in response to the 
2015 migration and refugee crisis, European governments stressed the need to address migration 
challenges by tackling the root causes, often adopting a narrow approach as addressing the causes of 
forced migration in order to curb migratory flows (Knoll and Sherriff, 2017). However, such a strategy is 
questionable (Carling and Talleraas, 2016; Clemens, 2014) partly because it underestimates the role of 
individual aspirations which tend to rise with socioeconomic development. The risk of such an approach 
is to support the instrumentalization of development cooperation for security purposes, often attaching 
a negative connotation to migration instead of thinking about the role and contribution of migration to 
economic development and structural transformation (Knoll et al., 2017). 
The rise of drivers instead of determinants and causes in the migration literature in the early 2000s goes 
along with the growing interest in environmental effects on migration, especially climate change (Black et 
al., 2011). It has progressively become clear from various case studies that environmental change could 
deeply shape migration. Yet, given the complex interactions within a variety of socioeconomic contexts, 
it seemed excessive to advance that climate change is a determinant of migration and the concept of 
drivers offers a better analytical option. They can be defined as factors that induce, orient and sustain 
migration (Van Hear et al., 2012, 2017), and that can be external or internal to the household. 
12 Additional definitions are provided in annex 6.
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They are forces that influence both decisions to migrate and migration processes. Compared to 
determinants and causes of migration, drivers might also have gained from tensions about causality in 
migration studies. The shift from causes and determinants to drivers allows for a better understanding of 
the complex dynamics that shape migration (Carling and Collins, 2017).
2.2 A critical literature review of past and present drivers of 
migration
Migration is a multidisciplinary field of study where research is strongly compartmentalized between and 
within disciplines, with limited analytical and methodological work across boundaries, failing to settle 
an agreed body of knowledge for the understanding of the migratory process. As a result, theories on 
the drivers of migration present core limitations and related broad empirical biases. Acknowledging that 
migration connects to all aspects of social existence, and thus requires an interdisciplinary approach, 
new theoretical advances have started to address these limits.
2.2.1. Conventional theoretical approaches: limitations and empirical biases
Conventional approaches of the drivers of migration mostly arise from the fields of development studies, 
economics, sociology and human geography. The following development focuses on the most prominent 
approaches and theories.
a. Conventional theories and their limitations
Since Ravenstein’s laws enounced more than one century ago (Ravenstein, 1885), the search for 
explanatory factors has been a long−standing feature of migration theories. However, in development 
studies and economics, migration was mostly considered from the 1960s only. The debate originally 
focused on causes and effects of migration independently and, more generally, tended to separate 
determinants and effects of migration from broader processes of socio−economic change (de Haas, 
2010a). This position meets determinist approaches of migration by neoclassical as well as structuralist 
theories which typically frame migration as a response to asymmetries and inequality, implying that a 
sedentary global society would be a condition for balance and equality (IMI ESF, 2011).
In standard neoclassical theory, the explanation of migration has focused on disparities in economic 
conditions between places of origin and places of destination. Push and pull models in classical literature 
suggested that migrants (as individuals) were pushed by low incomes in their countries or regions of origin 
and pulled by better prospects in more affluent areas (Lee, 1966; Harris and Todaro, 1970). General 
critics of this approach have argued that push–pull models basically present lists of factors which lack 
a framework to bring them together in an explanatory system (Skeldon, 1990). The static nature of such 
models is a further limitation. In conceptualising migration as a single action rather than a process, 
push–pull models do not account for shifting motivations, altered circumstances or decisions within the 
migration process itself (de Haas, 2011b).
At the end of the 1980s, neoclassical theory extended its scope to institutional dimensions. Other 
explanations for migration were then sought at the micro−level, such as in household decision−making. 
The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) theory conceptualises migration as a collective 
household strategy to mitigate livelihood risks and to overcome market constraints, rather than an 
individual matter in response to income differentials (Stark, 1991). However, due to its micro−level 
focus, NELM neither includes historical contextual factors, nor sets a clear connection between macro−
structural factors and household decision−making, because it does not specify hypotheses about the 
roles played by governments, policies, labour markets and power asymmetries (de Haas, 2011b).
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By contrast, within the general paradigm of structural history developed in sociology, Marxist, dependency 
and world systems theories (Wallerstein, 1974; Massey et al., 1998) picture migration as the effect of 
the expansion of global capitalism and the related marginalization and relocation of rural population, 
with no other option than joining the urban proletariat (de Haas, 2010b). These approaches are strongly 
questioned for being deductive and deterministic, with associated representation of individuals as passive 
victims of economic macro−forces. Individual migrants have limited agency and are supposed to make 
irrational choices. Further, like neoclassical ones, structural historical approaches focus on rural−urban 
migration, assuming the integration of migrants at destination, and the disruption of socioeconomic 
linkages with places of origin.
b. Common biases of empirical migration studies
These long standing and still dominant conventional theories about migration drivers have resulted into 
broad and now well−known biases that are still arising from the empirical literature. Four main critical 
woven biases related to various conceptual issues as well as data limitation can be mentioned: the focus 
on economic drivers, the national scale of analyses, the tendency to examine drivers of specific patterns, 
and the critical challenge of causality.
The focus on economic drivers
Conventional theories focus on how income and wage levels, and to a lesser extent, income inequalities, 
affect migration processes. While they might differ in their specification, they share a focus on economic 
differentials as the main driver of migration (IMI, ESF, 2011). But non−economic and unobservable factors 
also strongly influence migration decision (de Haas, 2011b; Mora and Taylor, 2006). Migration research 
tends to ignore the fact that, at the macro−level, migration processes are driven by a range of economic 
and non−economic factors. Similarly, at the micro−level, migrants are motivated by a combination of 
multiple, interconnected but distinct socioeconomic, cultural and political factors (de Haas, 2011b; 
Ruyssen and Rayp, 2013). For instance, gender differences in access to − and forms of − migration in 
Africa have been poorly documented although they are core dimensions of migration decision (Chort et 
al., 2018). A case study from Rwanda also points three critical factors in rural to urban youth migration: 
availability of social services in rural areas, which is likely to deter youths from migration, and presumed 
stable jobs in cities coupled with an inauspicious social environment in rural areas are likely to incentive 
migration (Mutandwa et al., 2011). Hence, understanding the role of non−economic and unobservable 
factors in driving migration and in mediating its impacts is a major research gap. 
National scale analyses
A second issue relates to the geographical scale of analysis. Beyond the fact that little is still known about 
the determinants of South−South migration (Ruyssen and Rayp, 2013), there is a tendency to examine 
and theorise migration at national level, as the dominant unit of analysis in migration studies. However, 
national level is often not the relevant scale given the context specificities of migration drivers. This raises 
the question of the relevant spatial level, beyond the nation−state, for analysing migration determinants: 
the region, bilateral migration corridors, or trans−multinational networks (IMI ESF, 2011)? In relation with 
the later, there is a general bias towards examining (international) migration from a receiving country 
perspective, as opposed to sending countries (de Haas, 2011b). This bias towards the receiving country in 
migration research stresses the need to develop a specific understanding of drivers of migration processes 
at different levels in countries of origin (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011). For instance, emigration policies 
implemented by sending states, or social security and welfare spending, are examples of potentially 
critical migration drivers (IMI ESF, 2011). Applied to rural−urban migration, access to infrastructure and 
services in sending rural areas are also often key migration drivers.
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The split between internal and international migration
Migrants’ journeys are increasingly diverse, complex and fragmented. Research on the dynamics of 
migration is very distinctly split, with limited connection, between studies on internal and on international 
migration, characterised by different concepts and methods (King and Skeldon, 2010). In particular, 
there is limited awareness about two−stage migration patterns, whereby journeys encompass internal 
− and − international migration. Further, there is still limited knowledge about the different nature of 
drivers according to migration patterns (international/internal/mixed; short/long term). This constitute a 
strong bias because of the selectivity of the migration process, drivers of migration being likely to differ 
across locations (Mora and Taylor, 2006). For instance, Herrera and Sahn (2013) exemplify the diverse 
nature and drivers of internal mobility, by differentiating between temporary and permanent migrants, 
their rural or urban origins and destinations. In short, the lack of a comprehensive framework of migratory 
patterns, which integrates more or less complex step−wise and circular trajectories, is a strong limitation 
for analysing the determinants of migration (Castagnone, 2011).
The endogeneity issue
Lastly, quantitative migration studies are not only challenged by data availability and limitation but also 
by the endogeneity problem that may be created by reverse causality. The latter refers to the recursive 
nature of the determinants and effects of migration decisions in situations where migrants maintain ties 
with their area of origin in various ways, including remittances (Mckenzie and Rapoport, 2007; Sabates−
Wheeler et al., 2008). The economic status of a household and other migration factors that might cause 
migration decisions are then shaped by the migration itself (Sabates−Wheeler et al., 2008; de Haas, 2010a). 
According to Bakewell (2011), scholars in migration studies seem to have progressively shifted away from 
methods that attempt to investigate causal mechanisms, a core reason (in addition to data issues) being 
that assessing causality entails to strongly reduce the complexity of migration processes. Particularly, 
this search for causality has led many empirical studies to consider in fine a simple, deterministic mono−
causal linear relation between a driver and a migration pattern. For instance, the causal connections 
and interactions of factors within the food security−migration nexus is often reduced to a proportional 
relation that can be addressed through policies related to agriculture and rural development. With such 
oversimplification, the view of policy makers about the food security−migration nexus is often naive and 
focuses on simplistic − if not inappropriate − solutions (Knoll et al.,2017).
As a result, there is still a limited understanding of forces driving migration. Limited push−pull and 
gravity models continue to likely omit crucial non−economic and socio−political factors, including in the 
sending−country or area. Despite the consensus that “macro−contextual economic and political factors 
and meso−level factors such as networks all play some role, there is no agreement on their relative weight 
and mutual interaction” (de Haas, 2011b). Therefore, the challenge is to establish when and why some 
drivers are more important than others, which combinations are more powerful than others, and which 
of them are more susceptible to change through external intervention in order to support more inclusive 
societies (Castles, 2010; Van Hear et al., 2017).
2.2.2. Emerging comprehensive approaches
Alternative research already started to set the base for a more comprehensive approach of the drivers of 
migration, stating that migration theory needs to include the multiple components of migration, the way 
migration fits in social relations, obligations, power relations and politics, as well as related to economic 
constraints that are all the “realities of displacement” (Carling and Collins, 2017).
2. Building a conceptual framework on drivers 
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a. The common ground: migration as part of social transformation
Recent efforts to rethink migration and the drivers of migration theory are often grounded in Castles’ 
understanding of migration from a social transformation perspective (Castles, 2010). He argues 
thatsignificant progress can arise from re−embedding migration research in a more general approach 
of society, linking it to broader theories of social change across different social disciplines. A conceptual 
framework for migration studies should take social transformation as its core component, in order to 
ease the understanding of complexity, interconnectedness, variability, contextuality and multi−level 
mediations of migratory processes in the context of fast global change. This means examining the 
links between social transformation and human mobility at various socio−spatial levels, while trying to 
understand how human agency can shape answers to structural factors (Castles, 2010).
Another development into rethinking the drivers of migration involves efforts to take time more seriously 
as a constitutive feature of migration (Cwerner, 2001). In conventional thinking, time is often interpreted 
as linear and can be split into pre−migration, migration and then either settlement or return. The result 
has been an emphasis on what is identified as ‘standard’ temporal practices. With regard to migration 
drivers, it led to codify standard patterns of time−bound migration. Recent research focuses on migration 
adopting a continuous time perspective: aspiration is not only socially situated but also future−oriented 
(Carling and Schewel, 2017); the “on−going−ness of migratory processes” is acknowledged (Erdal and 
Oeppen, 2017 in Carling and Collins, 2017); opportunities and obstacles can start but also end migratory 
pathways (Collins, 2017); and even mediating drivers are considered as part of sustaining and shaping 
migratory flows (Van Hear et al., 2017).
b. Integrating micro, meso and macro levels: bringing in capabilities, aspiration and structures
A conceptual framework at the level of the individual and household that is centred around ‘capabilities’ 
and ‘aspirations’ may facilitate the understanding of why some people move and others not, and also 
contribute to the development of micro−level migration theories (de Haas, 2011b; Carling and Collin, 
2017). Such a framework would provide a conceptual basis to link to meso− and macro−level forces in 
order to produce a more integrated view of migration drivers. As a result, researchers could analyse the 
extent to which meso− and macro−level factors affect migrants’ capabilities and aspirations. Crucially, 
a capabilities and aspirations theory of migration considers human agency as central in migration 
processes: it positions migration as an action towards realising individual livelihood goals, rather than a 
passive or predictable reaction to structural asymmetries and spatial opportunity differentials (de Haas, 
2011b).
To connect the capabilities and aspirations of individual migrants to more structural, macro−level 
determinants of migration, Willekens (2011) offers a conceptual framework derived from complexity 
science which shows how the interactions between agents (who have attributes and aspirations that 
change over time), between agents and structures, and the feedback mechanisms they generate, give 
rise to migration patterns and systems.
By analysing the role of meso−structures in migration processes, like the development of networks 
and migration systems, meso−level theories do not intend to offer a broad understanding of drivers of 
migration, but to provide a core link between individual and structural approaches (Faist, 1997). Socio−
anthropology and human geography research have underlined the importance of linkages, networks and 
culture in migration processes and how they result in powerful institutions (Boyd, 1989; Skeldon, 1990; 
Massey et al., 1993). Research also evidenced feedback mechanisms which explain why, once started, 
migration processes tend to become partly self−perpetuating, leading to the formation of migrant 
networks and migration systems (Castles and Miller, 2009; Mabogunje, 1970; Massey, 1990; Massey et 
al., 1998). 
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Such feedback loops provide a powerful example of the interplay between agency and structure. They 
show how migrants create meso−level structures, such as networks that have a (feedback) effect in 
reinforcing migration between particular places and countries. These networks fuel counter−flows of 
ideas and information (Mabogunje, 1970), as well as they reduce the costs and risks of migration (Massey 
et al., 1998), and contribute to the adaptation to structural constraints such as high travel costs and 
immigration policies. However, theories related to these ‘internal dynamics’ of migration processes also 
present some major faults. Particularly, the usual focus on migrants’ networks goes with a neglect of 
other feedback dynamics that run through the impact of migration on sending and receiving countries 
and places (IMI ESF, 2011). This is the case, for instance, of broader rural−urban linkages resulting from 
migration networks (e.g. such as productive and non−productive investments allowed by migrants’ 
remittances).
Similarly, for Carling and Talleras (2016), drivers of migration are multifaceted and often interact in a 
complex way leading to migration aspirations and decisions to migrate. The outcome of such decisions is 
mediated by migration infrastructure13 at a systemic level and capabilities at individual level (Xiang and 
Lindquist, 2014; Andersson, 2014).
c. Multi−dimensionality
Despite the need to integrate non−economic factors in migration decisions and processes, few research 
work offers a systematic and more exhaustive vision of the drivers of migration. In this way, Bilsborrow 
(2002), in a study on the broad linkages between migration, population change and rural environment, 
gives insights on a broader picture highlighting the diversity of the drivers of migration, notably the 
specifics of the drivers of rural migration in developing countries. According to his model connecting 
rural household decision−making about migration with the rural environment, households continuously 
evaluate conditions in the place of origin and elsewhere, to determine how to live or cope in difficult times, 
or whether to move to improve their standard of living. More important, he points the crucial roles played 
by contextual factors as determinants of rural households’ decisions about migration. These factors 
include: local and national natural−resource endowments; social and economic infrastructure; national 
and local government policies that determine land ownership and access to land; environmental policies 
and set−asides for protected areas; road construction; and the regulation (or lack) of extractive activities. 
They establish the physical context and rules of the game for household responses to demographic 
pressure and environmental degradation. In sum, as rural livelihoods highly rely on natural resources, 
Bilsborrow’s work points the importance of environmental drivers of rural migration (but also the influence 
of environmental stress on the drivers of migration) within other drivers such as specific sectoral or macro 
policies.
Ryussen and Rayp (2013) present a comprehensive human capital model of migration applied to SSA 
which is not particular to rural migration. This model not only integrates the economic drivers of migration 
but also the specific demographic, socio−political and environmental factors of countries of origin and 
destination, as well as characteristics of the regional context. Their work furthermore includes network 
effects and natural, cultural and infrastructure factors facilitating or not migrant flows to the host country, 
such as geography, transport, communication and psychological costs of migration. Such a model allows 
the assessment of the relative importance of different factors driving migration patterns. While evidencing 
that SSA’s migration results from a multidimensional set of factors, their findings suggests that migration 
is to a large extent driven by income differences, networks and geographical proximity. 
Black et al. (2011) provide a more comprehensive conceptual framework of the drivers of migration. 
Conceived as a pentagon of thematically classified drivers, they group migration drivers into five 
categories: social, political, economic, environmental and demographic. 
13 For Carling and Talleras (2016) the concept of migration infrastructure was developed by Xiang & J. Lindquist (2014) who argue 
that “it is not migrants who migrate, but rather constellations consisting of migrants and non−migrants, of human and non−human 
actors”. This is embedded within five dimensions: “the commercial (brokers, smugglers), the regulatory (state and procedures), the 
technological, the humanitarian (NGOs, international organisations), and the social (migrant networks)”.
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It is the existence of spatial and temporal variability in one or more of these five dimensions that creates 
the conditions (or drivers) for migration, allowing them also to interact or overlap in different ways in 
different places. For these authors, this is similar to a combination of push and pull factors, but it allows 
complex forces to act through systems of influence. Whether migration occurs or not in a place also 
depends on a series of intervening institutional factors. Individual and household characteristics also 
influence migration decisions. This framework raises a second crucial question: whether environmental 
change is likely to alter the effect of these drivers. This conceptualisation “seeks to focus attention away 
from the idea that environmental change directly causes migration, towards an understanding of the 
broader drivers of migration, and how these might act in different and inter−linked ways to environmental 
change” (Black et al., 2011). It is conceivable that environmental change might actually weaken the effect 
of a migration driver.
Finally, Van Hear et al. (2017), building from Black et al. (2011), raise the level of abstraction and look 
at ways in which drivers may be conceptualised and identified at different levels, and then specify a 
framework for understanding them, both singly and in interlocking complexes (cf. 2.3). They understand 
decisions to migrate –or not– and the inception of broad patterns of migration as the outcome of 
interplay between these socio−economic structures and agency. In any migration pattern, several driver 
complexes may interconnect to shape the ultimate direction and nature of movement.
Together, these approaches make important contributions to advancing the understanding of migration. 
First, they reveal the conceptual promise of re−engaging drivers of migration in ways that consider 
migrants agency and structural conditions as inter−connected systems. Second, they build on criticisms of 
dichotomies in migration by reassessing divisions between internal and international migration, migrants 
and non−migrants, and the linear timing of decision−movement−outcome. Third, by recognizing the 
openness of aspiration in migration, they build on social sciences’ growing interest for foresight thinking 
and, more generally, the future (Carling and Collins, 2017).
2.3. A critical synthesis of futures studies on migration 
In that perspective, this section presents a synthesis about what recent futures studies (forecast/
projection, foresight/scenario, and other studies), identified according to several key criteria (see 
methodology section 1.2.1), say about the futures of rural migration in SSA. It intends to provide emerging 
approaches about the drivers of migration. 
2.3.1. Existing studies on migration in Africa
37 studies corresponding to the relevance criteria were identified. Results are presented in Annex 4 in three 
tables for forecasting, foresight and other studies, using the Social, Technical, Economic, Environmental, 
Political (STEEP) classification to qualify the dimension of the identified drivers.14 The results displayed 
in Table 3 show that the number of studies matching the search criteria is rather limited and it was not 
possible to identify any highly relevant futures study, indicating a very weak futures literature about rural 
migration in SSA. It is also worth noting that forecasting studies are out−numbered by foresight studies 
and other analytical studies.
14 The STEEP (Social, Technical, Economic, Environmental, Political) classification is commonly used in futures studies (Saritas and 
Smith, 2011; Slaughter, 2008; van Notten, 2006).
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Table 3: Main features of 37 identified futures studies
This limited relevance of the futures studies literature can be explained by the fact that migration is the 
most unpredictable demographic factor at least for mid−term exploration of the future (10 to 20 years). 
All migration components (type, direction, intensity, duration, even existence) are highly volatile and the 
potential effect (direction and intensity of change) of a specific driver on migration is not always clear. In 
a study dedicated to the effect of climate change on migration, Black et al. (2008) concluded that “…
we are a long way away from predicting with any degree of certainty what the migration consequences of 
climate change might be over the next 40−50 years”.
Furthermore, drivers do not operate in isolation. Echoing Black et al. (2011) and Van Hear et al. (2017) 
frameworks, the way the evolution of one driver affects migration depends on how other drivers will also 
evolve (RMMS and IMI, 2012). As a result, while there is substantial empirical knowledge about what 
can induce, orient and sustain migration, it is almost impossible to predict what will happen locally. In 
addition, strong criticism about forecasting migration exists: “Most of the predictions were affected by 
the same flaws and biases as were current estimates: a weak or inexistent methodology, and a tendency 
to use the numbers in order to raise awareness” (Gemenne, 2011). Migration is very volatile and difficult 
to predict as it is sensitive to shocks of various nature such as economic crises, military conflicts, policy 
changes, themselves highly unpredictable (Bijak et al., 2015).
Yet, it is possible to unveil, explore and understand uncertainties related to migration and use that 
foreknowledge to guide actions towards desirable migration futures. The construction of future scenarios 
is an alternative approach to forecasting (OECD, 2016).
Forecasting studies Foresight studies Other analytical studies
8 studies identified. 2 are rated 
++, 4+, and 2+−
17 studies identified. 5 are 
rated ++,8 +, and 4 +−
12 studies identified, 5 are rated 
++, 1 + and 6 +−.
The scale of these studies 
spans from global to regional 
and national levels. While all 
five dimensions are present 
across the studies, the 
economic dimension prevails 
being present in all of them, 
followed by the social and 
political dimensions, then 
the environmental and finally 
technological dimension. 
Economic asymmetries are 
identified as a recurrent driver 
followed by demography.
Regional and global scenarios 
prevail, with only one case 
of national / intra−national 
scenarios. Economic and 
political drivers are the most 
often cited (12 and 11 times), 
then environmental (7), social 
(6) and technological (5) 
dimensions. Global economic 
asymmetries, local economic 
situation and income gaps are 
the main economic drivers. 
Political situation and migration 
policies are recurrent drivers 
of the political dimension. 
Climate change and variability 
are referred to as broad 
environmental drivers, while 
water, soil and energy are more 
specific issues. Technological 
innovation is a broad driver with 
ICT and farm structures being 
more specific.
Global and regional studies 
prevail, with only one national 
study. Economic drivers 
are most frequently cited, 
particularly employment 
opportunities and economic 
differentials including poverty 
and inequity. Environmental 
drivers refer to climate change 
and more specifically to water, 
land and ecosystems. Migration 
policies, political situation, 
geopolitics and conflicts and 
crises characterize the political 
dimension. The social dimension 
is associated with demography 
and social links. Farm structure 
and digital gaps correspond to 
the technological dimension.
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2.3.2. Drivers
A detailed analysis of the most relevant studies according to the STEEP classification provides the 
following insights regarding each of these dimensions.
Economic drivers are frequently associated with an economic differential between areas of origin and 
areas of destination. Migration is related to inequalities and tends to occur from places with less attractive 
economic local conditions, regarding particularly poverty, income levels and opportunities, employment 
and labour market conditions – especially for the youth, towards emerging more attractive areas abroad 
or within the country (to urban areas). 
Political drivers regroup a cluster that could be called global political drivers (global governance) and a 
cluster related to national political drivers (national governance). The latter includes the capacity of the 
state, the political system, national migration policies and investment policies. The future states of this 
cluster would condition the aspirations of people to move or stay where they live. The global cluster is 
linked to the global political situation (global and regional governance regimes, geopolitics, migration 
policies of destination countries). It shapes not only the potential destination of migrants but also the type 
and intensity of competition between migrants towards countries of destination. War and conflicts, both 
national and global, bring even higher levels of uncertainty in migration patterns.
Social drivers include a demographic dimension (growth of population, natural population growth in the 
cities) that, associated with social development levels, the state of institutions in areas of origin and the 
level of food insecurity, would be shaping the intensity of migration. While historical and linguistic links and 
social receptivity are seen as major determinants of the direction of migration, individual characteristics 
such as education, network connection, and the capability to migrate (associated also with poverty and 
income levels) are seen as shaping trends about who migrates.
Environmental drivers include the generic terminology of climate change and climate variability. Beyond 
these terms, the studies stress the importance of energy (type and access) and natural resources, 
particularly water availability, soil quality and population/resource ratio.
Technical drivers include broad terms such as technical progress and innovation, technical change, 
scientific and technical innovation. ICT is highlighted and studies with a focus on agriculture see the 
technical means of production and the level of farm outputs as determinant factors.
The drivers of future migration in SSA are not only multiple across economic, social, political, environmental 
and technical dimensions, they are also interconnected as most studies refer to two or more dimensions. 
As highlighted in the above theoretical review (section 2.1), the way they are connected is a source of 
uncertainty. Climate variability and climatic hazards for example would be affecting differently potential 
migration patterns depending on the economic, social and political conditions where these events would 
take place. Similarly, network connection, linguistic and historical links can be connected with the social 
receptivity of the migrants and migration policies in destination countries in opposite ways.
2.3.3. Future patterns of rural migration
Drawing from a study on megatrends of human settlement taking into consideration the potential effect 
of climate change and the evolution of human settlement (Valsson and Ulfarsson, 2012), it is possible 
to identify plausible global population moves in SSA for the next 30 years as indicated in Table 4 below.
These global alternative futures were combined with another anticipatory study exploring seven plausible 
scenarios for rural areas (Bourgeois, 2015). It resulted in the development of three anticipatory narratives 
regarding SSA’s rural migration based on scenarios that could become dominant in each world order.15 
15 The transformation scenario was not included, as it would require a time horizon beyond 2050.
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Table 4: Global patterns of migration and potential implications for SSA
Source: (*) Valsson and Ularfsson 2012; (**) − Adapted by the authors
The clusters of economic and political determinants previously identified indicate the importance of 
the future state of the global world order regarding migration. A discussion of the futures of SSA’s rural 
migration needs therefore to take into consideration alternative future worlds. For this purpose, it is 
possible to refer to Dator’s seminal anticipatory work on global alternative futures which proposes four 
alternatives (Dator, 2009): 
• Continued growth: the pursuit of current trends where continued economic growth is seen as the 
driver of development and the only pathway;
• Discipline: refocus economy and society on survival and fair distribution, and not on continued 
economic growth;
• Collapse: economic, environmental, resource, moral, or ideological collapse possibly leading to 
extinction or at least to a significantly lower level of wellbeing/development;
• Transformation: the transformation of all life, including humanity from its present form into a new 
“post human” form, on an entirely artificial Earth.
Patterns* Reason* SSA patterns**
To the poles Rising heat, lack of water, 
overpopulation, dwindling resources, 
and pollution in the central tropical 
areas of the globe push away people 
towards more temperate areas
Under these circumstances SSA 
population would be expected 
to move towards South Africa, 
Botswana, Zimbabwe
To coasts in warm 
regions
Cooler coastal areas in very warm and 
warming countries. Coasts pull people 
as they offer different types of climate. 
Increasingly hot and often dry interiors 
in already very warm central regions 
push away human activity and people 
from the interiors
In many sub−Saharan countries, 
coastal areas are not particularly 
cooler and would be warming too. 
The effect on population would 
be to draw people mostly towards 
coastal areas of Southern Africa
To higher areas in 
warming regions
The warming of colder high interiors 
of warm countries would draw more 
activity and people. A reverse push 
from some coastal areas due to 
overpopulation or warmer conditions 
could accompany this move
This could induce population 
movements towards central 
areas of Southern Africa and 
East Africa highlands
Towards new 
prospering centres of 
human activity
New/emerging prospering centres of 
human settlement increasingly attract 
people and activity, while others 
decline lacking opportunities to thrive
This would lead population 
moving towards attractive 
existing capital cities, new 
economic corridors and emerging 
economies such as Gauteng and 
Western Cape provinces in South 
Africa, the East African corridor, 
or the coastal West African 
conurbation
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These narratives, which are presented in Annex 5, indicate that prospects for massive flows of rural 
out−migration from SSA are limited. None of them would offer options that would significantly improve 
the living conditions of migrants. This anticipated trend is consistent with observations highlighting that 
only higher educated, highly qualified and, to some extent, semi−skilled migrants would find labour 
opportunities through intercontinental migration (OECD, 2009; World Bank, 2009). Rural SSA’s migrants, 
unless significant local development with regard to their education, skills and assets, would be among the 
most disadvantaged.
Future SSA rural migration is drawn to happen within the same country or within the same region, towards 
few areas which could benefit from climate change (e.g. new cropland) or towards emerging economies 
and urban centres. Existing social networks, language similarities and diaspora links will play a major 
role in shaping the preference and direction of the migrants, a role further reinforced by advances in 
technological connectivity.
Unless societal choices are made that would enable SSA’s rural people to be in a situation to freely 
choose and have the capability to migrate, it is important to pay attention to options where SSA rural 
population would not have to migrate. The discipline scenario offers clues on what this would mean: a 
refocus on balanced territorial development, offering decent livelihoods and fair access and rights to use 
the resources. 
A complex geography of migration in SSA is emerging from this literature review and analysis.16 The 
futures of rural migration in SSA is shaped by a multi−dimensional combination of drivers including 
crucial variables such as the size of the rural population, the location and occurrence of extreme weather 
events (droughts and floods), the level of poverty and food insecurity, access to decent job opportunities, 
the quality of governance, and the attractiveness of human habitats. In this way, futures studies highlight 
both the specificity of the drivers of rural migration with regard to environmental factors, demography 
or particular sectoral policies, and the relevance of emerging comprehensive approaches in conceiving 
drivers of migration as multifaceted and multidimensional, mostly acting in complex combinations (see 
2.1.2). Rural migrants will go to African rural or urban safe havens that provide peace, stability, decent 
lives and livelihoods. The combinations of drivers at play are locally specific, making it impossible to 
predict where exactly these places will be found, but it is possible to anticipate what could happen and 
act in consequence. There is a risk of a massive convergence of migration flows towards a limited number 
of safe havens. Once their maximum absorption capacity is exceeded, their social receptivity to migrants 
will fade, leading to conflicts that will threaten their existence, possibly turning them into hostile places. 
More migrants would likely move and look for other options, returning to their places of origin or moving 
to less−populated areas with possibly limited opportunities and harsher natural conditions.
2.4. The proposed framework for analysing the drivers of rural 
migration
To avoid the sedentary bias of the mainstream political discourse, which portrays migration as a problem 
to be fixed (Bakewell, 2007), and in line with Castles (2010), policy debates about migration should not 
be based on the normative objective of finding ways of helping people to stay home. Instead, based on 
a better understanding of the processes underway with reference to the existing literature, they should 
postulate that migration is a normal part of social relations and research shoul dcontinue to help analyse 
the drivers and dynamics of migration, as a part of complex and diverse processes of societal change. If 
a normative goal exists, it should not be to belittle migration but to find ways so that it could take place 
under conditions of equality and respect for human rights. 
16 See Atlas FAO−Cirad, spread 12 (Bourgeois, 2017) for a representation of these dynamics.
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Although it is elusive to look for a one−size−fits−all theory explaining migration at all places and at all 
times, there is certainly room for advancing theories on migration and how they mutually connect to 
social and economic change (IMI ESF, 2011).
Drawing from interdisciplinary and comprehensive approaches based on Black et al. (2011) and Van 
Hear et al. (2017), as well as learnings from futures studies, this working paper proposes a conceptual 
framework for generating improved insights into the nature and combination of the drivers of migration. 
This framework is intended to help unravelling the mechanisms at stake in the migration process, shaping 
rural migration patterns in the diversity of African contexts, and their linkages with rural socio−economic 
transformation. Figure 1 adapted from Black et al. (2011) synthetizes the proposed framework of drivers 
of rural migration and related migration patterns.
First, taking stock of studies on rural migration that identify a diversity of factors which influencing 
migration decisions and processes, the framework integrates both economic and non−economic 
drivers of rural migration, with reference to Black et al. (2011) broad classification in five dimensions 
(environmental, political, economic, socio cultural and demographic). Following Van Hear et al. (2012, 
2017), in each of these dimensions drivers can have different functions17 that shape the conditions within 
which people make the decision whether to migrate or not.
Fig 1: The multifaceted drivers of rural migration 
Source: Atlas FAO−Cirad − Mercandalli, Losch, Rapone, Bourgeois and Khalil, 2017.
Second, the proposed framework is a recognition that a comprehensive examination of the drivers of 
migration should bridge micro, meso and macro levels to achieve a better understanding of migration 
processes. Thus, drivers can be rooted either: at individual and household level (micro); at global level 
(macro), international or national; and at local to sub−regional level (meso). They can be related to a 
receiving or sending area (a community or a region), or work across these locations, possibly transnationally.
Drivers may play at short or long term depending on the nature of their timescales. Hence, migration 
processes and outcomes are context specific; they may even vary within a specific place.
17 This means that for instance, in a given context, a particular economic or political driver might have a range of different functions in 
the chain of causation that induce, orient and sustain migration. Van Hear et al (2017) identifies five functions: predisposing, proximate, 
precipitating and intervening factors that shaped what is termed ‘migration orders’.
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Third, the framework considers that the many drivers which initiate, orient and sustain migration at 
micro, meso and macro levels do not operate in isolation. Instead, drivers work in combination, and their 
effects are intertwined in what can be called drivers complexes. However, by contrast to Van Hear et al. 
(2017), who restrict the use of drivers complexes to more external material forces influencing mobility, 
the approach proposed in this paper follows Benson and O‘Reilly (2009) and includes aspirations as 
driving people’s migration.
The concept of drivers complex helps identifying specific multi−level and multi−dimensional sets 
of drivers of migration; it improves our knowledge on migration processes and the specific form and 
structure of migration patterns. For any migration pattern, several drivers complexes may interconnect in 
shaping the direction and nature of people’s mobility. 
Fourth, to achieve a precise understanding of factors driving migration decisions and processes and the 
way they interact (in shaping migration patterns), the proposed framework includes the critical issue 
of causality and feedback effects.18 Beyond identifying migration’s key drivers and how they may be 
configured, the framework points out, in certain contexts, what makes some drivers more prominent 
than others. As such, it establishes when and why some drivers matter more than others (Castles, 2010; 
Van Hear et al., 2017). Cognizant that migration is a constituent of broader social and economic change, 
this comprehensive framework of migration’s drivers grants that the impacts of migration in origin and 
destination societies reciprocally affect the conditions that drive migration. Through these recursive 
loops, impacts are, or can become, migration drivers on their own. 
Fifth, and related to the previous point, a drivers complex also considers the possibly simultaneous self−
sustaining and self−undermining internal dynamics supported by migration processes. This is illustrated 
in situations where migrants maintain ties with their area of origin through consumption, investment, or 
social remittances (Levitt, 2001). This type of dynamics increases socioeconomic and spatial linkages 
with potential impacts on rural and structural change simultaneously facilitated by new livelihoods 
strategies shaped by mobility (Mercandalli, 2014, 2015). In such situations, migration can be considered 
as a migration structure and appears as a mechanism of adaptation and resilience in a context of multiform 
mutations (Delaunay et al., 2016). This view differs from migration conceived as a disruptive element for 
areas of origin developed in structuralist theories.
The drivers complex framework must be considered as a proposal for future heuristic in−depth research 
and this working paper cannot develop and test all its dimensions. Indeed, according to the methodology 
adopted in this work, the following sections illustrate local drivers of migration in places of origin and 
destination, and existing global changes, obstacles and enablers in the migration process. The individual 
and household characteristics are only partially addressed through quantitative analyses (cf. 3.3 and 
4.1). A complete picture of the on−going migration processes would require more empirical data from 
fieldwork and surveys which barely exist, in order to feed more dedicated datasets and engage in further 
quantitative analyses. This additional research investment to be develop in the future would allow to take 
into account individual aspirations and causality, just to mention these two core elements, and the way 
drivers complexes shape a diversity of migration patterns (internal and international, short and long term, 
and for specific socio economic groups, economic sectors or places).
18 Aware that migration is an integral part of socioeconomic change, which makes analytically difficult to disentangle ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ 
and to set direct causation, research on causality has lessen. Further, defining causal mechanisms may lead to the tentative setting of 
‘laws’ explaining migration which can only be ill−suited when applied to different migration contexts (IMI ESF, 2011).
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3. What do we know about migration dynamics and 
patterns in sub−Saharan Africa?
The general patterns of rural migration in sub−Saharan Africa are very specific when compared to other 
regions. Shaped by the socio−economic and political conditions of the continent (section 1.1) and a 
unique demographic context (3.1), they are characterized by three main features: (i) most of international 
African migration occurs within the continent; (ii) internal migration is the dominant form of migration; 
and (iii) renewed and diverse forms of migration such as rural−rural or circular migration develop besides 
the more traditional rural−urban pattern. Overall, migration in Africa has become a more complex and 
diverse process in terms of intensity of movements, as well as diversity and types of destination and 
trajectories (3.2). These contrasted and diverse migration patterns create new functional spaces that are 
shaped by socio−economic networks depending on the characteristics of changing rural−urban linkages 
and migrants’ profiles, which are also more diverse (3.3). These new characteristics contribute in return 
to the reconfiguration of migration patterns in recursive loops of complex causality. 
3.1. A unique demographic context
Rural out−migration in SSA is taking place in a unique context characterized by a continued growth of 
population at an unprecedented scale, a related massive expansion of a young labour force, as well as a 
steady growth of rural population due to a delayed and stabilized pace of urbanization (Losch, 2016b). 
These processes result in a challenging densification of rural areas, with direct impacts on natural 
resources and the nature of rural livelihoods, notably an increased mobility and the diversification of 
activities, which directly affects migration patterns.
Sub−Saharan Africa was the last region in the world to engage in its demographic transition and, unlike 
Asia, this transition is slower than expected. While in Southern Africa and some coastal West African 
countries the number of children per woman has dropped to less than three, most of other regions of the 
continent show slower and erratic declines (Guengant and May, 2013). As a consequence, demographic 
projections are regularly revised upwards by the United Nations. Between 2010 and 2017, the estimated 
SSA population in 2050 was increased by 208 million people, with the region projected to reach 2.2 
billion inhabitants by the mid−century (UNDESA, 2010, 2017). This demographic growth represents a 
massive, unprecedented change in scale. 
At the same time, SSA is also unique in the enduring importance of its rural population. In 2018, an 
estimated 60 percent of people were still living in rural areas (UNDESA, 2018) and the region remains 
mainly rural due to its relatively recent urbanization process (from the 1950s).19 The urban population has 
increased tenfold since the 1960s, mostly through a dual dynamic of densification from the bottom with 
burgeoning small towns, and metropolization to the top with booming megapolises − e.g. the South Nigeria 
megapolis from Onitscha and Ibadan to Lagos and spreading towards the neighbouring Benin (Chatel 
et al., 2016). However, urban growth has stabilized at around 3.5–4 percent per year today, against 5 
percent and more before the 1980s – a result of the limited structural transformation of most of SSA 
economies and of the fiscal austerity related recession between 1980 and 2000. While rural population 
has grown at a slower pace (estimated at 1.7 percent, with some countries still at 2.5 percent and more), a 
continuous densification of the rural space has taken place due to the growing size of the rural population. 
As a result of the demographic growth, the labour force of the region has increased by 330 million 
between 1985 and 2015. In parallel, a change in the age structure, with a growing number of people 
entering the economically active group (aged 15 to 64 years) has progressively improved the effective 
19 Eight SSA countries only have less than 50 percent of rural population.
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dependency ratio20 from nearly 1 in the 1980s to 1.2 today. However, by 2050, the number of active 
people should increase by more than 800 million (2.5 times more than in the previous 35 years) and 
therefore the utmost challenge for SSA is to generate enough employment in order to absorb its booming 
labour force. The annual cohort of youth entering the working age group in 2015 was estimated at nearly 
20 million of which around 60 to 65 percent were located in rural areas.
This dynamic puts a huge pressure on rural economies, particularly on agriculture through an increasing 
pressure on natural resources. SSA has long been under−populated but today the picture has changed: 
the density in 1950 was 8.2 inhabitants per km² and it reached 44.3 in 2015. These averages mask huge 
differences between regions and countries. Sparsely populated areas due to adverse natural conditions 
(e.g. Namibia) or historic under−population (e.g. the Congo Basin) coexist with dense settlements (e.g. the 
East African highlands, the Sudanian zone, and export−oriented agricultural areas). In dense settlement 
areas, this huge pressure on many local agrarian systems raises the question of their viability. Tensions 
between uses (agriculture versus urbanisation or mining) and users of land and water are growing rapidly, 
sometimes exacerbated by the consequences of climate change (Magrin and Losch, 2013; Chamberlin 
et al., 2014). 
3.2. Continuity and diversification of migration patterns
This unique context is the place where a growing diversity of migration patterns have taken place and 
continue to develop. SSA’s migration today is characterized by three major features: i) internal and 
international migration to African countries prevails over overseas migration, ii) rural–urban migration 
remains prominent – a consequence of the existing large rural population and the ongoing urbanization 
process, and iii) diverse rural–rural, urban–rural and circular migration have also developed, and are 
recognised as core and growing dynamics. 
3.2.1. Intra−African migration and its historical roots
Migration has historically structured Africa which is often portrayed as a continent on the move 
(Bakewell and de Haas, 2007; Flahaux and de Haas, 2016). In 2015, about 33 million Africans were 
living outside their home countries, but more than half of these international migrants had moved within 
Africa (UNDESA, 2015a). Yet, this figure masks sharp differences between North Africans migrating 
overseas (90 percent) and sub−Saharan Africans mostly moving within Africa (nearly 70 percent), often 
to neighbouring countries. Western and Eastern Africa are the most dynamic regions in terms of sending 
and receiving countries. With respectively 5.7 and 3.6 million intra−regional migrants in 2015 – counting 
for 97 percent and 67 percent of total migrants – they exemplify SSA’s strong intra−regional dynamics, 
with leading hosting countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia. They also highlight the 
role of regional economic communities, which adopted regulations facilitating the free movement of 
people (see below). South Africa is the other major hub for intra−African migration. According to the 
2016 Community survey, the country counts 1.6 million born outside of South Africa, mostly from Central, 
Eastern and Southern Africa, but irregular migrants – who are a most debated issue in national politics – 
could reach a maximum of almost the same number.
However, the effective movements of people are even stronger as international data neither include 
significant unrecorded intra−African migration, nor the dynamics of circular or non−residential migration 
between countries and within countries (Flahaux and de Haas, 2016; Adepojou, 2000a). These forms of 
migration, although less visible because poorly measured, are recognised as being core for the dynamics 
of current African migration (Potts, 2013; Black et al., 2006). Indeed, if African migration is partly 
facilitated by free circulation regimes within regional economic blocks, it is also resulting from the porous 
nature of national borders that facilitates circulation of people and informal cross−border trade (Nshimbi 
and Moyo, 2018). Moreover, evidence from several countries in different regional contexts suggests that 
20 Ratio between working age and non−working age people.
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internal migration is often the dominant migration pattern across SSA (cf. figure 2). It represents about 
80 percent of migration in Nigeria and Uganda, 50 percent in Kenya and Senegal, but 38 percent only 
in Burkina Faso due to its specific historical relation with bordering Côte d’Ivoire. This supports global 
estimates that consider the number of internal migrants as six times higher than the number of emigrants 
(UNDP, 2009).
Figure 2 Rural and urban migration by destination (selected countries)
Source: Atlas FAO−Cirad, spread 2 – Mercandalli, S and Losch, B., eds., 2017.
The importance of circular migration within and between countries results from the consolidation 
and development over time of networks rooted in structured economic, social and family relations, 
which were progressively facilitated and strengthen by the improvements of infrastructure and 
communication.
a. Early and colonial times
Major migratory flows are constitutive of the history and the expansion of several ethnic groups, such 
as the Bantu from Central to Southern Africa. Long−standing and long−distance movements of people 
also occurred from north to south, supporting the development of the much debated ‘Hamitic myth’ in 
East Africa (de Bruijn et al., 2001), as well as across the Sudanian and Sahelian regions. These migration 
have resulted in multi−layered processes of settlement and contributed to the consolidation of the ethnic 
mosaic characterizing the specific dynamic of African population (Adepoju, 1995b). 
Although some of these movements lack historical evidence, many authors agree that they have played 
and continue to play a significant role in the construction of Africa (Bilger and Kraler, 2005). These 
movements of people were initially associated with the search for safe land for farming or grazing in 
response to the variations of climate or socio−political circumstances (pilgrimages, internecine 
warfare,and slavery). Except when villages were abandoned (Nkamleu and Fox, 2006), migration was 
generally circular, of short duration and seasonal (Bakewell and de Haas, 2007, Chapman and Prothero, 
1983). For instance, over centuries, pastoral nomads seasonally moved with their livestock in the search 
of green pastures: in the Horn of Africa, between today’s Somalia and Ethiopia, in East Africa between 
Kenya and Tanzania (Makinwa−Adebusoye, 1983, 2006), in West Africa between northern Nigeria and 
Cameroon (Gwen, 1976) and between the Sahel and the Sudanian region. The trans−Saharan and trans−
Atlantic trade, deeply structured by slavery, increased the circulation of very mobile groups organized 
around ethnic, religious and solidarity networks like Diola, Soninke, Hausa, and Pulaar (Charrière and 
Frésia, 2008).
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With the drawing of formal borders by and between European rulers in the aftermath of the Berlin 
Conference (1885), colonization impacted the movement of people and the prior territorial organization. 
Ethnic and cultural groups were divided between different colonies (Adepoju, 1995b) and the colonial 
project, based on the exploitation of local resources, led to a new spatial polarization impacting migration. 
Each colonial power developed its own infrastructure. It was generally spatially oriented, perpendicularly 
to the coast (with a toothcombs shape) where a port was built that was often both the main town and a 
railhead to ship out local commodities (Magrin, 2013; Losch, 2016a). It was the start of the current urban 
network and its development and of the expansion of agricultural exports and mining activities.  
This new spatial framework was consolidated by the introduction and enforcement of colonial policies 
based on various coercive measures like forced labour, forced population displacements (Charrière 
and Frésia, 2008), and taxes which were motivated by colonial needs. It was also strengthened by new 
incentives related to the development of the cash economy (fostered by the obligation to pay taxes) with 
opportunities to access direct or indirect paid employment (waged labour in agriculture, mining, services 
and share−cropping systems in agriculture). 
It resulted in new migration dynamics and the development of rural − urban patterns from the hinterland 
to coastal cities and of export agriculture and mining areas. Many of these migration were circular, 
often seasonal, like in Côte d’Ivoire and the Gold Coast (today Ghana), where they contributed to the 
development of the plantation economy based on coffee and cocoa, or in Senegal and Gambia where 
seasonal workers (named ‘navetanes’) were pillars of the expansion of groundnut production (Ndiaye and 
Robin, 2010).
Beyond colonial rivalries, cooperation between colonial powers for a profitable exploitation of local 
resources resulted in organized flows of workers from labour reserves regions. They were regulated by 
specific treaties, like between Portuguese Mozambique and South Africa (providing workers to South 
African mines), or between Spanish Guinea (today Equatorial Guinea) and British Nigeria (providing 
workers from the Calabar region to cocoa plantations in Fernando Póo island, today Bioko). Cooperation 
was also formalized between different territories under the same colonial rule. This was the case in British 
East Africa and in French West Africa, where Côte d’Ivoire and Haute Volta (today Burkina Faso) had a 
joined migrant labour office21 which formalized the migration of workers from North to South.
b. Post−independence: between new barriers and tentative integration
These long−standing migration patterns, blending precolonial and colonial dynamics, contributed to 
shape the spatial organization of the continent, with pre−emerging poles of urbanization which were 
mostly coastal cities − Dakar, Abidjan, Accra, Lomé, Cotonou, Lagos, Douala, Maputo, Dar−es−Salaam 
– and a few others inland ones like Ibadan, Leopoldville (today Kinshasa), Johannesburg and Nairobi. 
Dual and contradictory processes were at play from the years of independence, which occurred mostly 
in the early 1960s. They resulted from the consolidation of the new nation states on the one side, and the 
emerging and fragile pan−Africanist movement towards increased integration on the other side.
Independence conditions accentuated the pre−existing spatial arrangement because each new 
state tried to build its national unity from what already existed, strengthening the administration, and 
expanding local equipment and services from the new capital city. Struggle for political power resulted 
in the dismantling of colonial federations (French Western and Equatorial Africa, British East Africa, 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland). As a result, new national borders were consolidated by the new 
political powers, which were in situation to control the rent system (Magrin, 2013) based on extraction of 
natural resources (agriculture, forestry and mining) and control of trade flows.22
21 The Syndicat interprofessionnel d’acheminement de la main−d’œuvre (SIAMO) created in the early 1950s.
22 Hence the historic feature of the “gatekeeper” (Cooper, 2002) because crossing national borders produces the rent based on exports 
and imports control and taxation, the port−capital becoming the system’s nerve centre.
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With a few exceptions like Côte d’Ivoire, most of the new states introduced restrictions on residency, 
employment and circulation for foreign nationals, often as a result of local politics supporting ‘national 
preference’ for access to the labour market (Adepoju, 2000a) and therefore fuelling xenophobia. Times 
of political turmoil and economic recession (often closely connected) were more favourable to these 
dynamics like in Ghana in the 1970s, or the spectacular deportation of 1.3 million foreigners by Nigeria 
in two weeks in January 1983 (Afolayan, 1988). During that period, Ghana and Nigeria turned from net 
immigration to net emigration countries (Black and King, 2004). 
However, other forces supporting integration have also been at play driven by the objectives of pan−
Africanism. Progresses at the continental level were quite slow, with the creation of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, followed by the African Union in 2001. The most tangible successes 
are found in the multiple processes of regional integration, which started progressively from the 1970s 
with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) created in 1975. There are today eight 
regional economic communities (RECs)23 and most intergovernmental protocols include free circulation, 
residence and settlement of people. Even if those protocols are sometimes poorly enforced − because 
often the right to reside and work remains controlled − regional integration strengthens migration flows 
toward the main hubs like South Africa in the SADC, and Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria in the ECOWAS 
(Adepoju, 2000b).
Nevertheless, these dual and contradictory processes of withdrawal into the nation state and development 
of regional and African integration were simultaneously disrupted by other driving forces. The first one 
is related to the environment and particularly droughts. Major ruptures were the Sahel, with two crisis 
peaks in 1973−74 and 1982−84, and Ethiopia in the mid−1980s. Other regions were also particularly 
affected over the last three decades and continue to suffer from the deterioration of climatic conditions, 
primarily the Horn of Africa (Somalia, North−East Kenya), Sudan and South Sudan, Chad, and parts of 
Southern Africa. All these climate related events deeply affected rural communities of agro−pastoralists, 
with famine and herd losses, and fuelled migration. 
Another source of disruption has been recurring conflicts, which affected the continent since the 1960s. 
They were motivated by liberation movements in Southern Africa with the delayed independence of 
Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) and Namibia in the 1970s−1980s, intensified by the 
rivalries of the Cold War and the involvement of the apartheid regime of South Africa. They also resulted 
from the difficult consolidation of the new national states, due to insufficient skilled human resources and 
weak governance, austerity policies related to structural adjustment programmes leading to worsening 
socio−economic conditions, which sparked civil and regional wars. Among others it can be mentioned: 
in East and Central Africa, Somalia and Ethiopia, and the Great Lakes region; in West Africa, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, and then the major crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, affecting the power engine of the region and 
that deeply impacted sub−regional migrations with hundreds of thousands of migrants returning at least 
temporarily to Burkina and Mali (Losch, 2005).
Today, the destabilization of the Sahel, in relation with jihadism fuelled by rural poverty and the 
disintegration of Libya, is a major new threat disrupting previous migration networks and leading to 
movement of refugees. These poles of instability contribute to the emergence of new migration routes to 
Europe, mostly via Libya and Morocco. 
In all these contexts affected by conflicts or climate−related events, free movements of people and 
workers were and are substantially replaced – over very variable periods of time − by forced displacements 
(Oucho, 1995; Bakewell and de Haas, 2007). These displacements mostly engage rural−rural and 
rural−urban movements (Nkamleu and Fox, 2006) and contribute to the complexity of today’s migration 
patterns and processes.
23 In addition to ECOWAS: the East African Community (EAC), created in 1967 and reinitiated in 2000; the Economic Community 
of Central African States (ECCAS) in 1983; the South African Development Community (SADC), only created in 1992 but initiated 
in 1980; the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in 1989; the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1994; the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996; and the Community of Sahel−Saharan States (CEN−SAD) in 1998. Other 
regional groupings exist but they do not have the same status with regard to the African Union.
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3.2.2. Revisiting rural−urban migration
All these deeply rooted factors of change and recurring specific circumstances have shaped rural 
migration. What is old and what is new in the on−going processes? According to Ma Mung et al. (1998), 
migration all around the world is today impacted by globalization, which changes attitudes and practices. 
Three main consequences are identified: the transition from definitive return to alternative return; the 
development of diaspora and community networks; and an increased circulation of individuals. Africa 
has followed the same kind of dynamics from the point of view of migrant volumes and new migratory 
practices, somewhat exacerbated by the specific context of the continent. These new dynamics, still 
difficult to grasp, contribute to a progressive spatial reconfiguration and the emergence of new territories 
shaped by people’s practices.
Rural migration in SSA today is characterized by the co−existence of traditional rural−urban and rural−
rural movements of people (Nkameleu and Fox, 2006) and by new and renewed practices resulting in 
contrasted patterns.
Data displayed in figure 2 (above), representing a small sample of five West and East African countries, 
remind us that the majority of migrants originate from rural areas, particularly in Uganda (85 percent) and 
Burkina Faso (91 percent), which are representative of many SSA countries. It reflects SSA’s still growing 
and dominant rural population and it is not a surprise that already significantly urbanised countries like 
Nigeria, Senegal and Kenya have more migrants coming from urban areas. Yet, even in Nigeria, rural 
migration is still a strong feature. Therefore, the traditional historical process of migration from rural 
to urban areas remains a strong pattern of SSA’s migration, even if its rate declines over time: from 1.1 
percent per year in the 1960s, to 0.8 percent in the 1970s, and 0.5 percent in the 1980s according to 
Chen et al. (1998). 
This trend explains why sub−Saharan Africa is the continent where the contribution of migration to 
urbanization has been the smallest (Berdegue et al., 2014b). This specific phenomenon is related to 
the conditions of SSA’s structural transformation which have impacted its urbanization process, with a 
slower urban growth when compared to other parts of the world (Fox, 2012). Limited urban employment 
opportunities in the formal sector and the impact of structural adjustment programs (Suttie and Vargas 
Lindus, 2016), a large precarious informal sector, and the quasi−absence of safety nets have contributed 
to narrow the income gap between rural and urban areas. The importance of the rural−urban income 
gap has been the traditional driver for net rural–urban migration. However, in SSA, its reduction − which 
is supposed to temper migration flows − has not been the result of better−off rural population but of 
stagnating or reducing urban incomes. 
Among the consequences of these intertwined processes was a rising livelihood vulnerability which has 
led to an increased propensity for mobility, not just into towns but also out of them (Potts, 2012). It also 
resulted into the development of circular migration that affected the net rate of migration to urban areas 
and contributes to explain the importance natural urban growth in SSA (Potts, 2013; Tshirley, 2015).
The vulnerability of urban livelihoods is not the only factor supporting circular migration. Broad rural–
urban linkages in SSA are also embedded within strong social, cultural and political dimensions. Recently, 
in Senegal, Herrera and Sahn (2013) found that more than half of the total internal migration was 
temporary, and oriented from rural to rural or urban to urban, contrary to the widely studied processes 
of rural to urban permanent migration. Similarly, in countries like Zimbabwe or Mozambique, there is 
evidence of widespread national and international circular migration under a variety of forms (Potts, 
2012; Mercandalli, 2017).
Rural–rural migration contributes to population redistribution in many countries. In various regions, it 
used to be the most common type of migration (Bilsborrow, 2002) and it continues to be a strong pattern 
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related to the densification of the rural space, the progressive reduction of farm sizes, and the need 
to access to new land resources. In 2010, rural−rural flows constituted about one third of the internal 
movements of people in Burkina Faso and Uganda. Rural–rural migration are stimulated when land 
access is possible in other regions – like in Madagascar today – or when new activities develop, such 
as artisanal mining in several regions of West Africa. They often result from the possible extension of the 
agricultural frontier –a major feature of Côte d’Ivoire’s development process − and can be associated 
with crises and changes in environmental factors. However, most often, rural–rural migration results 
from limited employment opportunities in cities. Rural migration to other regions within the country or 
in neighbouring countries is also often linked with dynamic cash−crop production areas (e.g. cotton, 
groundnut, cocoa, coffee and rice) that offer employment opportunities to a large number of workers, 
with sometimes migration routes initiated during the colonial times.
Migration in Africa has thus become a more diverse process as migrants’ journeys are becoming 
increasingly multiple, complex and fragmented. Renewed and diversified migration patterns have 
thrived over the last decades between capital cities, small and regional towns, and their rural hinterlands 
(Mercandalli and Nshimbi, 2016). These dynamics witness the blurring of limits between rural and 
urban spaces and livelihoods, and the growing importance of rural–urban linkages (Tacoli, 2002), thus 
portraying a new African rurality (Pesche et al., 2016). The static rural and urban categories no longer 
capture the mixed lifestyles and socio−economic behaviours related to the intensifying rural–urban 
relations (AfDB et al. 2015; Losch, 2015).
3.3. Rural migrants’ profiles
Migration patterns and dynamics in SSA are context−specific, crafted by more or less complex 
combinations of intertwined drivers: people migrate for different reasons, reflecting diverse situations, 
opportunities and constraints shaped by local circumstances. Poverty and wellbeing, economic 
diversification, political and social conditions at country and regional level also matter. Thus, migrants 
form a population that is diversified, reflecting the heterogeneity of local situations and selective 
processes. Their profiles are primarily determined by individual and local characteristics such as age, 
gender, household sizes, assets, activities, and incomes. 
As such, rural migrants are not significantly different from other rural dwellers. This apparently 
paradoxical situation results from the relative homogeneity of SSA’s rural areas − when compared with 
other regions of the world like Latin America – in terms of income levels and assets. When looking at rural 
households’ income quintiles, rural poverty is widely spread with limited income differences between 
quintile 1 to 4 and a significant gap with the fifth quintile (Losch et al., 2012; IFAD, 2010). Instead of one 
core determinant, it confirms that, at the micro level, the decision to migrate results from a combination 
of specific individual and family characteristics (networks, education, and assets) shaped by the local 
context, and/or of individual preferences (cf. section 2 and figure 1). 
Within the migration process itself, these individual and household features can, in turn, evolve and 
reshape migrants’ profiles through feedback effects. 
MRHS and LSMS data used in figure 324 tell us that rural migrants are mostly young people, with 
limited education and employable skills, and that the majority of them come from households relying 
on agriculture. In 2015, Africa had the highest proportion of young international migrants (aged 15−24) 
representing 34 percent of total migrants, and the median age of all African international migrants was 
24 For the World Bank Migration and Remittances Households Surveys (MRHS): (1) Nigerian Migration Household Survey of 2009; (2) 
Ugandan Migration Household Survey of 2010; (3) Burkinabe Enquête ménage sur la migration et les transferts de fonds of 2010; (4) 
Senegalese Migration and Remittances Household Survey of 2009; (5) Kenyan Migration and Household Survey of 2009. For the World 
Bank Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS): (1) Ethiopian Rural Socioeconomic Survey of 2013−14; (2) Malawian Integrated 
Household Panel Survey of 2013; (3) Nigerian General Household Survey of 2012−2013; (4) Ugandan National Panel Survey (UNPS) 
from 2009 to 2014; (5) Malian Enquête agricole de conjoncture intégrée aux conditions de vie des ménages (EAC−I 2014). See annex 1 
for more details.
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29 (UNDESA, 2015b). Looking more closely at a diverse group of SSA countries (Senegal, Burkina Faso, 
Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya), these trends are similar for internal migration. Young people predominantly 
move within their home country and form the majority of rural migrants. Overall, around 60 percent of 
rural migrants are between 15 and 34 years old and female migrants are generally younger than their male 
counterparts. These general characteristics of youth profiles are confirmed by specific youth surveys and 
country case studies (Elder et al., 2015; Estruch et al. 2019). 
The majority of international rural migrants are males − 60 percent to 80 percent in Eastern and Western 
Africa, respectively (UNDESA, 2015b) − which can partially be explained by specific social constraints 
affecting rural women (Chant, 1998). However, looking at internal rural migration, the situation is somehow 
more balanced. Further, in West Africa, some young girls aged below 15 years migrate whereas boys 
rarely do, indicating frequent employment as housemaids (cf. figure 3). The region is also characterized 
by larger families (with often seven or more members), which are usually more prone to have migrants, 
reflecting the difficulties of youth to access and inherit agricultural land, which is a potential incentive, 
among others, for migration (cf. section 4.1).
Figure 3 Characteristics of rural migrants and migrant households (selected countries)
Source: Atlas FAO−Cirad, spread 3 − Dinbabo, Mensah and Belembeba (2017).
Rural migrants have lower school attainments than their urban counterparts. However, the majority of 
rural migrants come from households that have better educated members than non−migrant households 
(cf. Annex 7). This difference in terms of additional human capital can facilitate the first step of the 
migration process thanks to greater knowledge and social networks. When looking at the employment 
status of rural migrants at their destination (cf. fig. 3), it appears that the majority of those with limited or 
no formal education ends up in self−employed jobs, while those that have reached above the secondary 
education level are more likely to access waged employment. 
On average, rural migrant households have slightly larger farm sizes (cf. fig.3), possibly indicating greater 
assets to support migration. At the same time, there is little difference between migrant and non−migrant 
households in terms of access to agricultural extension services or agricultural investments (notably 
irrigation systems, which are very limited). 
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These results are confirmed by data robustness for a broad selection of socio−economic variables (cf. 
Annex 7).
Earnings of households with migrants are only slightly higher. Mali and Uganda display, on average, a 
quite under−differentiated situation. In Mali, the use of national level data masks the strong income 
effect of international migration in the few regions that have specialised in migration overseas. The 
share of migrant households earning more than US$2 per day per capita is between 20 and 30 percent 
– about 5 to 10 percentage points more than the case of non−migrant households (cf. fig. 3). These 
few characteristics validate the long−held view that migrant households tend to be better off (Azam 
and Gubert, 2006; de Hann and Yakub, 2010) and that the poorest can rarely migrate as resources are 
needed to do so, in particular for international migration. The slightly greater wealth of households with 
migrants is also confirmed by their better access to infrastructure and services such as safe drinking 
water, sanitation and electricity. However, the differentiation between the two groups of households in 
terms of equipment (such as housing, radio or motorcycle) is limited (cf. Annex 7).
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4. Analysing the drivers of rural migration: 
evidence from available data and case studies
This section focuses on migration drivers. It first attempts to support or invalidate what is known about 
drivers and determinants of rural migration at the micro level, using available RuLIS datasets for six 
selected countries. Then, it further analyses selected situations from five additional country case studies. 
The case studies were selected based on their relevance with regard to the drivers at micro, meso and 
macro levels, and the existence of drivers complexes that are locally specific. It also illustrates the 
evolving configuration of drivers complexes overtime and addresses the specifics of the climate change 
as a driver of migration. 
4.1. What do we learn from existing datasets: drivers at 
individual and household levels
By providing individual and household information, RuLIS data partly inform about the micro level drivers 
of migration (cf. fig 1). Descriptive and multivariate analyses confirm general knowledge about existing 
drivers. First, at the individual level, the main reason for migration is often an economic one although 
it is not the only one and does not prevail in all situations. Second, at the household level, data confirm 
that wealth is likely to be an important driver of rural migration as migrant households are among the 
better off, but household size and education attainments are also likely to be core drivers. Therefore, 
when considering households’ potential drivers of migration, it appears that most may turn out to be 
determinants according to the country or the local context. It means there is no possible generalization: 
determinants of migration – defined as the drivers that influence the most the decision to migrate within a 
system of drivers (cf. section 2) − are context−specific. The overview of existing national surveys supports 
the importance of sub−regional analyses and the need to articulate micro level drivers with meso and 
macro levels ones in a complex of explanatory factors.
4.1.1. Reasons for migration at individual level: age, sex and location matters
At the individual level, the search for work or economic opportunities remains the dominant factor for 
rural migration for all countries (fig.4 and 5), followed by access to education, except for Ethiopia. The 
desire to join family generally ranks as the third reason for moving, reaching near and up to 30 percent in 
Ethiopia and Uganda (fig 5). It is worth stressing that even if economic reasons prevail in most countries, 
it is not the only driver and in the reality of individual lives it might often be combined with education (in 
particular for youth) and/or family motivations. Further, work motivated migration is usually higher in rural 
than urban areas reflecting the lack of opportunities and broad underemployment in the countryside.
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Figure 4: Main reason for migration (rural migrants, selected countries)
Source: Atlas FAO−Cirad, spread 3 − Mercandalli, S and Losch, B., eds., 2017
When looking at reasons for migration according to destination (cf. fig. 5), both at the national and rural 
levels, professional reasons are relatively more prominent for international migrants, with the exception 
of Kenya, and particularly for rural migrants. 
Figure 5: Reasons for internal and international migration (selected countries)
Source: FAO, 2017
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Finally, gender disaggregated data (cf. table 4) reveal that in most of the selected countries, women migrate 
primarily for family reasons, especially within their own country. After marriage, women are more likely to 
relocate to where their husband is living. In rural areas, the percentage of women migrating for work−related 
reasons is generally higher compared to urban areas. This is the same for the younger age group (15−34), 
except for Kenya.
Table 4: Reasons for internal and international migration by gender and age group (15−34)
Source: FAO, 2017
The individual data from national surveys highlight and confirm the limits of analyses at the national 
level and the need to consider individual motivations by location, sex and age to understand the diverse 
dynamics that underpin individual migration decision. Deeper analyses at sub−regional level according 
to above categories would be even more informative.
4.1.2. Reasons for migration at household level: both wealth and relative deprivation drive migration
Drivers of migration also stem from the household level as family members can collectively make migration 
decisions together with the prospective migrant. This view, aligned with the New Economics of Labour 
Migration framework (Stark, 1991; see section 2), broadens the scope for understanding the drivers of 
migration. This is particularly relevant in rural areas and for family farming where strategic decisions for 
the allocation of family resources are often collectively made.
Cognizant of the hypothesis that household wealth is an important driver of rural out−migration in Africa 
(Awumbila et al., 2015; Azam and Gubert, 2006), a principal components analysis (PCA) was carried out 
to assess a relative household wealth indicator (cf. 1.3), which helped to comparatively understand how 
rural MHHs and NMHHs differed.
Results (factor scores) pointed housing conditions (“household has solid roof”), access to infrastructure 
facilities (electricity) and household ownership of tangible assets (cell phone) as variables capturing most 
of the variability of wealth and likely to be its main determinant, for both rural MHHs and NMHHs for each 
country (cf. annex 8).
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Further, based on this relative household wealth index, a quintile wealth indicator was generated for 
each country by clustering the index into poorest, second, middle, fourth and richest groups (Vyas and 
Kumaranayake, 2006; Córdova, 2009).
Overall, results reveal a trend: in four out of six countries, the proportion of rural MHHs belonging to 
the fourth and richest wealth quintile were higher compared to their rural NMHHs counterparts – 24, 
37, 28 and 39 percent of MHH in the richest quintile. Further, for these same countries, the proportion 
of rural MHHs who belonged to the first two quintiles (poorest and second) compared to rural NMHHs 
were lower. However, data from Mali and Ghana show different results: slightly different in Mali where the 
share of MHH in the second quintile is higher; a reverse pattern in Ghana where rural MHH are more in the 
poorest quintile and less in the richest (cf. fig 6). The results for Ghana can be explained by the relative 
importance of rural incomes related to cocoa cultivation – a quite profitable export cash crop – where 
rural migrants are more likely to be rural people with no or limited access to farm land.25
Nevertheless, these results based on non−causal, comparative analyses tend to validate the common 
assertion that most rural migrant households tend to be wealthier – as a result of positive returns to 
migration − and consequently can potentially afford to send out a family member within or outside of the 
country. But the divergent paths of Mali and Ghana also show that a relative deprivation can also motivate 
migration. 
This finding corroborates detailed analyses on various waves of LSMS by Kafle et al. (2018) arguing that 
relative deprivation of wealth26 is positively associated with migration and that migration increases with the 
absolute level of wealth. This suggests that both absolute and relative deprivation need to be considered 
at the same time to better understand the drivers of migration: households make a migration decision 
by considering both their relative deprivation as well as their absolute levels of income or wealth (Czaika 
and de Haas, 2011; Quinn, 2006). Migration increases with wealth but it increases more among relatively 
deprived households. In addition, Kalfe et al. also state that the positive effect of relative deprivation 
on migration (“migration−relative deprivation relationship”) is amplified in rural, agricultural and male−
headed households. This implies that policies that aim to reduce inequalities and support safe, orderly 
and regular migration flows may need to pay attention to the socioeconomic structure of the population 
for better results. Policies that account for the demographic and occupational heterogeneity and create 
opportunities for youth, rural residents, and farmers in their locality may do far better than those that 
target the general population (Kafle et al., 2018).
25 A similar explanation can be proposed for Mali in relation to access to cotton production, another export cash crop.
26 Household’s relative deprivation depends on well−being status of other households in the community as well as the feeling of 
household’s members about their position within the local wealth distribution. It is in this way that people from relatively more deprived 
households have higher incentive to migrate as migration occurs not only to maximize the expected income, but also to minimize the 
feeling of deprivation relative to their neighbours or communities (Stark and Yitzhaki, 1988; Stark, 1984; Stark and Taylor, 1991).
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Figure 6: Wealth quintiles by rural households’ migration status – 6 countries
Source: computation based on RuLIS data
Using binary logistic regression (BLR) with eleven explanatory variables commonly used in the literature 
(see their definition in Annex 3), Table 5 presents the odds ratios that allow direct interpretation of 
determinants and drivers of migration.27
Results highlight that most of the selected variables contribute as determinants with significant differences 
between countries. It confirms the impossible generalization about determinants of migration and the fact 
that drivers with the most leading role within a system of drivers are context specific.
BLR yielded mixed results per country with the exception of household’s size, which significantly predicted 
rural out−migration for most countries. Owing a cell phone was also found to significantly increase the 
likelihood of migration from rural areas. In most countries having access to ICTs facilitates the free flow of 
information between prospective rural migrants and their social networks and, consequently, contributes 
to the decision to migrate.
27 An odds ratio is a measure of the association between two variables (the exponential of the coefficient), here between the possibly 
explanatory variable and being a migrant household (MHH). When the odds ratio is greater than 1, it means that the variable increases 
the likelihood of migration. Conversely, if the ratio is less than 1, the variable is negatively associated.
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Contrary to assertions that rural households’ experience of weather adverse conditions and market 
shocks tend to influence their propensity to send−out a household member, results show that neither 
experience of weather shocks nor market shocks are significant predictors for four countries (Malawi, 
Mali, Nigeria and Uganda). Overall, the mix of either push or pull human, demographic and economic 
factors of rural out−migration varies with the country according to origin and destination contexts. These 
factors highlight the existence of a blend of drivers and determinants of rural migration. 
Looking at individual country ratios, a few trends can be further discussed with regard to the existing 
literature − results being interpreted all things being equal (ceteris paribus). In the case of Ethiopia, for 
the variables number of highest years of education in household and size of land owned, one additional 
unit is associated with an increase in the probability of out−migration of 5 and 14 percent respectively. 
This pattern is also found when the household has a working cell phone and a solid roof (increasing the 
likelihood of migration by 59 and 44 percent respectively). When women’s share of household labour 
increases by 10 percent, the probability of migration increases by 6.9 percent. Conversely, having an 
additional person in the household and experiencing market shocks significantly reduces the probability 
of migration by 13 and 33 percent respectively. This result contrasts with the hypothesis that the size of 
the family and more importantly household’s experience of shocks drive them to send out a member. In 
their study on Ethiopia, Tegegne and Penker (2016) found household’s size to be a significant predictor 
of rural out−migration. This difference in results may be explained by the local context, and more likely 
by the fact that a single year was used here for the regression analysis with inherent endogeneity issues.
In Mali, highest years of education in the household and household’s size were found to increase the 
likelihood of migration by 11 and 7 percent. Interestingly, in a household owning an operating cell 
phone, the likelihood of rural out−migration increases by a factor of 3.6 – the highest amongst the three 
significant predictors.
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Table 5: Logistic regression analysis results of determinants and drivers of rural out−migration 
Source computations based on RuLIS data.
Note: **Significant at the 1 percent level. *Significant at the 5 percent level; n.a. ~ Not available.  
The limited results yield from the exploration of available data are a strong reminder about the difficulty in 
investigating the drivers and determinants of rural migration (see section 1).28 Existing datasets only allow 
to inform about broad drivers of rural out migration, focusing on the micro level (individual or household) 
and on a limited number of dimensions. They are more suitable to analyse rural migrants and households’ 
profiles than the drivers of migration per se, even if they also provide a wealth of information on rural 
migration dynamics in the surveyed countries. This assessment calls for a broader qualitative approach, 
bringing into the picture other analytical levels (meso and macro) and other dimensions of existing drivers 
for a better understanding of their specific local nature.
28 The low levels of pseudo−R2 with regard to the size of the samples corroborates this finding.
Variable Odds ratio results
Ethiopia Ghana Malawi Mali Nigeria Uganda
Highest years 
of education in 
household
1.05** 1.23** 1.13** 1.11* 1.02 0.99
Female share of 
household labour
1.96** 1.64 1.49 0.29 1.61 0.60
Household size 0.87** 1.14** 0.92* 1.07** 1.07** 1.19**
Weather shock 0.85 n.a. 0.93 1.33 1.15 1.19
Market shock 0.63** n.a. 0.80 1.01 0.54 1.39
Size of land owned 1.14** 1.02 0.49** 1.01 0.72* 0.64*
Total livestock 
owned
1.03 1.01* 0.73* 0.96 0.79 1.11*
Household owns 
operating cell 
phone
1.59** 2.06* 1.83** 3.60** 2.09** 1.01
Solid roof 1.44** 0.93 0.96 0.79 n.a. 1.76
Access to social 
insurance
0.89 1.16 0.71 1.55 0.19** n.a.
Access to electricity 1.15 0.90 1.41 0.05** 0.95 0.83
Constant 0.34** 0.00** 0.05** 0.01** 0.04** 0.01**
N 2,916 4,943 2,954 1,946 2,609 2,296
Wald chi2 93.87 163.49 103.65 84.78 50.89 34.53
P−vale 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002
Pseudo R2 0.0540 0.0951 0.0878 0.0922 0.0535 0.0578
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4.2 Bringing other dimensions and levels of drivers of rural 
migration
Through a selection of five case studies (see Mercandalli and Losch, 2017) − namely Senegal, Madagascar, 
Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique − this section sheds light on core dimensions of the proposed 
framework, intending to highlight stylized facts about existing drivers complexes, including their variety, 
commonalities and specificities, and how they shape the diverse form and structure of migration patterns 
at national and regional level, according to the context in which migration processes take place (4.2.1). 
In addition, two situations are analysed which are significant for the understanding of the nature of drivers 
complexes. First, the case of south Mozambique evidences the shifting nature of drivers complexes over 
time, unfolding migration processes rooted in colonial labour systems and ongoing liberalisation. Second, 
the complex nature of climate change as a driver of rural migration is addressed and its contribution to 
drivers complexes in a wide range of African migration patterns is highlighted (4.2.3).
4.2.1. Drivers and patterns of rural migration: main insights from five country case studies
Common features of the drivers of rural migration can be identified in the different case studies (cf. table 
6). First, echoing the ongoing demo−economic transition in SSA, a common driver at the micro level is the 
predominance of migrants in the active age (15−64 years), most of them being young active people moving 
for real or perceived opportunities of income generating activities. This is associated with migrants’ basic 
level of education in most case studies − another micro level factor sustaining the migration process 
through evolving mindset and aspirations. Second, at macro or meso (regional) levels and linked to the 
above, all case studies reveal a relative demographic density in rural areas. Third, supporting previous 
research findings on the drivers of rural migration, environmental factors always play a role through the 
availability or access to resources as land, water, or the vulnerability of these factors. It is directly related 
to a significant pressure on natural resources resulting from the population patterns pointed before. 
However, they show different degrees of importance. Finally, improved infrastructure and communication 
are common features of contemporary drivers of rural migration, influencing their characteristics and 
fostering mobility towards more diverse destinations. Together, these initial considerations support 
the evidence that if economic drivers and particularly access to new income is important, it is always 
combined with a variety of non−economic drivers conditioning the migration process. 
Beyond these commonalities, all case studies inform about the context−related specificity of drivers 
of rural migration, suggesting their unique combination and the greater role played by some drivers at 
particular geographical levels. For instance, in Madagascar, in addition to the common drivers reminded 
above, it seems that adverse climatic conditions and, above all, land pressure act as determinants of 
migration in many regions. It gives a crucial role to environmental factors in the migration processes but 
other specific drivers like religion or political instability are also embedded in the local drivers complexes. 
In Zambia and Mozambique, in relation with past colonial history, social and family networks are likely 
acting as determinants of migration patterns at the meso level, in interaction with specific regional drivers, 
like migration policy in Mozambique or new economic sectors in Zambia. 
Another element is the diversity of migration patterns shaped by specific drivers complexes within the 
national space. Indeed, drivers complexes of rural migration have a particular relation with rural change 
and structural transformation, which calls for a multi−level approach dealing with the idiosyncratic 
dimensions of places of origin and destination. 
In contexts facing major structural challenges, as illustrated by the deep spatial imbalances existing in 
Senegal, the drivers complexes of rural−urban migration are likely to accentuate the processes at play
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(Ba et al., 2018): the effects of migration on the socio−economic structures of areas of origin (through 
local investment in agriculture or others sectors) will take time to impact territorial development. On the 
contrary, in Zambia, internal rural−urban migration related to thriving medium scale farming and mining 
sectors might have deeper and quicker effects on rural change.
Table 6: Current patterns and drivers of rural migration: synthesis from 5 country case studies
Country Case
Main migration patterns
Main Drivers: Level and Dimensions 
(Demographic, Economic, Social, Political, Environmental)
Micro 
(individual or household)
Meso 
(locality or province)
(o) at origin; (d) at 
destination
Macro 
(national and global)
(g) at global level
Senegal
1) internal rural−urban 
to Dakar−Thiès−Touba
mostly temporary/
seasonal
2) internal rural−rural 
to Delta and Nyayes 
regions
3) international rural− 
urban to Europe: Italy 
France
diversified in terms 
of migrants’ profiles, 
destination areas, and 
sectors of activity
Age and sex: 15−34 years 
(60%), young girls (<15years)
Active youth population 
growth(o)
Rural population growth(d)
Real or perceived 
opportunities to improve 
living conditions: income 
and education−training in 
first place
Underemployment(o) , 
low incomes (o), lower 
living cost in medium 
cities (d), employment 
prospects in specific value 
chains (horticulture) and 
domestic services in cities 
& rural areas (d)
Economic structural crisis 
(d) 
Power relations within 
household or community, 
weight of elders, basic 
education level
Socio economic networks 
(mourides) and “culture” 
of migration (o+d)
Existing irrigated areas (d) European Union  restrictive 
migration policies/
geopolitical context (d/g); 
improved communication 
(transport and mobile 
phone) (o+d)
Low or no access to assets 
and resources (land, 
livestock…)
NR degradation−drought 
(o), land pressure (o); 
access to grazing and 
pastoral resources(d)
MADAGASCAR
1)internal rural−rural
2)internal rural−urban
mostly spontaneous but also 
organized and forced
Population growth & rural 
population density
Access or search of 
economic activity, search of 
capital for land investment, 
perception of better job 
opportunities in rural areas
Insufficient income and 
living conditions (o), high 
competition and labour 
supply in urban informal 
sectors (d)
Strong territorial imbalances 
and uneven population 
densities
Land market access 
embedded in family and 
neighbour networks, specific 
arrangements to manage 
family / individual assets, 
religion, culture of migration 
(south)
Solidarity networks (o+d)
Organised migration policy 
(o+d), political instability (o),
poor public infrastructure in 
villages (o+d)
Decreasing average farm size 
or no land inheritance
Land pressure/scarcity(o), 
NR pressure(o), climatic 
hazards
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Country Case
Main migration patterns
Main Drivers: Level and Dimensions 
(Demographic, Economic, Social, Political, Environmental)
Micro 
(individual or household)
Meso 
(locality or province)
(o) at origin; (d) at 
destination
Macro 
(national and global)
(g) at global level
ZAMBIA
1) internal rural−urban 
North and Western provinces
2) internal urban−rural
3) internal rural−rural 
Western and Southern 
provinces to the Central and 
North−Western provinces
mostly diversified circular or 
return migration
Youth
Lukewarm perception 
of urban opportunities, 
search for additional 
incomes, flexibility to look 
for quick options
New mining boom in 2000 
(d),
development of medium 
scale farming (d)
Migration culture for male 
(colonial mining), non−
economic motivations 
(family), access to 
education and to services
Strong social network 
inherited from past mining 
labour dynamics (o+d)
Better infrastructure & 
communication networks 
(o+d)
Support to urban services & 
infrastructures  (d)
Better infrastructure & 
comm. networks (o+d)
Successive droughts and 
animal diseases (o), high 
land availability (d), good 
rains (northern regions) 
(d), or adverse climatic 
conditions, land scarcity 
which put pressure on 
agricultural activities(o)
SOUTH AFRICA
1) internal rural−urban
both circular and permanent 
towards rural towns or cities 
within the same province or to 
another province.
Active age 15−64 years and 
mostly youth, household 
head, tranditionally mostly 
men but increseangly also 
women
Unemployment (o); low 
returns in smallholder 
agriculture(o)
Persistent rural urban gap 
(o+d)
Secondary education, 
family−related reasons, 
aspiration to better living 
condition/livelihoods in 
urban areas
Under equipment (water, 
electricity) & services 
(health, education) in rural 
communities (o), social 
housing, education in urban 
centres (d)
Improved infrastructure 
(o+d)
MOZAMBIQUE
1) international rural urban
2) internal rural urban
diversified both circular and 
permanent
Mostly men, active age 
15−64 years
Aspiration or access to new 
income / activity
Low return agriculture (o) SA primary sector 
restructuring & job loss (d); 
growth with inequalities, rural 
poverty (o)
Culture of migration since 
colonial time and loss of 
interest in farming, family 
reason and access to 
education
Consolidated strong social 
networks between previous 
war refugees/IDP and 
relatives in Mozambique 
rural areas (o+d)
Lack of services and market 
access (o)
South Africa laws discourage 
permanent immigration (d); 
improved infrastructures & 
comm (o+d)
Pressure on NR (land 
degradation, drought) (o)
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4.2.2. The evolution in time of drivers complexes: the case of Mozambique
The history of migration between rural South Mozambique and South Africa, from colonial times to 
independence and post−apartheid, shows how the configuration of drivers of therural migration and 
related patterns deeply evolve over time. Shifting drivers complexes are rooted in the regional political 
economy and a range of environmental, sociocultural and economic factors acting locally in sending 
and receiving areas at both micro and meso levels. They result in a strong and sometimes very quick 
adaptation capacity of rural migrants and their families. In the last 15 years, renewed migration drivers 
complexes and patterns have resulted in a growing differentiation of rural livelihoods and in slow rural 
transformation.
During colonial time, circular migration have developed under the regime of the labour system related to 
the mining industry (Mercandalli and Anseeuw, 2017). The huge labour needs of the thriving South African 
mining sector led to bilateral agreement signed in 1897 between the Portuguese colonial power and the 
Transvaal government for the provision of workers. The cooperation system was improved in 1928 with 
a convention ensuring the provision of Mozambican migrant labour in exchange for taxes and incomes 
for the workers, whose return to their place of origin was enforced after each contract (GoM, 1928). This 
policy, targeting rural men, established South Mozambique as a ‘labour reserve’ (Amin, 1972). In the 
1940–1950s, about one third of active males in Inhambane Province worked in South African mines, and 
to a lesser extent, on sugar plantations (First et al., 2001). With wages up to 300 percent higher than those 
offered by local Portuguese companies and planters under the forced labour system (xibalu), workers’ 
choice was obvious: for a majority, it was the only way to escape both xibalu and an exploitive hut tax 
(Brock, 1989).
Regular short−term circular migration between the main gold and coal mining areas (mostly in Transvaal 
state) and rural localities of South Mozambique was the dominant migration pattern. In places such as 
Leonzoane (Massinga District), it concerned 65 percent of active men. A minor pattern was the migration 
under the xibalu system towards Mozambican cities and harbours (Maputo, Beira, Chimoio) for handling 
and railways construction, or agricultural labour (cotton, sugar).
With men spending more than half of their working lifetime in South Africa, this migration system 
translated into a deep restructuring of family labour and farm activities. It gave rise to dominant ‘peasant–
miner’ livelihoods in which men were engaged in low−wage labour, and women and children maintained 
a subsistence farming system at home.
A second period starts with the independence of Mozambique in 1975 that radically changed power 
relations between the new Marxist−oriented government and the apartheid regime (Abrahamson and 
Nilsson, 1995). Economic and military destabilization by neighbouring South Africa (and Rhodesia – 
today Zimbabwe) directly and quickly affected prior migration patterns conditioned by warfare, drought, 
food insecurity and social networks at the core of the drivers complex of troubled independence times. 
First, South Africa cut labour migration enrolment to the mines: from 1975 to 1976, the recruitment 
of miners in South Mozambique dropped by about two−thirds (First et al., 2001). Second, in the early 
1980s, new economic and military actions contributed to undermining the socialist project that relied 
on state−owned farms producing for export and domestic food needs. Foreign−backed attacks led to 
the destruction of main national infrastructure, as well as disruption of economic flows. Moreover, the 
development of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) resulted in guerrilla activities that 
affected rural areas and prevented any regular agricultural production. When destabilization reached 
larger parts of the countryside from 1982, economy and agricultural production collapsed and about 
half of the country’s population became dependent on external food relief. Exacerbating this situation, 
natural hazards (1982–1985 droughts) also affected food production.
As a result, population movements in Mozambique increased with people fleeing violence. Gradually, 
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over one third of the population was forced to leave their land, move to cities or military−protected rural 
areas, or flee abroad as refugees. At the end of the war in 1992, an estimated 1 million Mozambicans 
had died, about 1.5 million were refugees abroad, and 4 to 5 million had been internally displaced 
(Raimundo, 2009). These movements and families’ choices were also strongly determined by existing 
kin and social networks, within Mozambique or in South Africa, where many mining migrants had stayed 
after independence. In Leonzoane, 82 percent of the people had left, either to Massinga, Maputo or South 
Africa, helped by their networks, but leaving their land and possessions behind.
Within this configuration of drivers, interacting in nuanced ways in war troubled times, new migration 
patterns emerged. Long term domestic migration increased as a consequence of limitations of 
displacements due to war. In Leonzoane, 70 percent of households just moved once within Mozambique 
or to South Africa, with rare home returns; others did a two−step migration, within the country and then 
to South Africa, with no return, at least until the end of war. Local livelihoods were further impacted upon, 
with a lesser involvement of males in agriculture and a growing role for the informal sector.
With the end of warfare (1992) and apartheid (1994), a renewed combination of drivers reshaped 
migration patterns characterized by diversified circular migration led by liberalization and social networks. 
In this third period, slow economic growth in democratic South Africa did not provide enough jobs for the 
black low−skilled labour force. High unemployment and the development of poorly paid and informal 
jobs directly impacted upon migrants from rural Mozambique, since they were likely to compete with 
unemployed local workers. Foreign miners, hit by large job losses in the 1990s, had no choice but to enter 
sub−contracting, casualization and undocumented labour.
In Mozambique, the government had turned to a market−oriented economy. The new economic growth 
occurred with strong inequalities, rising rural poverty, and the broad family farming sector lacking the 
needed support in traditionally sending rural areas. Migration remained an option for many, but mostly 
towards the South African informal economy. Despite South Africa’s new immigration laws offering more 
rights to migrants, authorities clearly discouraged permanent immigration and the result was an increase 
of undocumented migrants.
With peace, people were able to move again – helped by improved infrastructure and communication. 
Refugees who decided to stay in South Africa or in Mozambican cities consolidated social networks with 
their relatives in rural areas. Stronger and more complex linkages between places and people led to 
the expansion of new migration patterns toward a diversity of circular movements. Two−step migration 
patterns, national and then international, with home returns or short term visits have developed. These 
profiles are the more mobile and reflect multi−sites patterns, with shifting residences. The numbers of 
long−term national or international migration have also increased. This comes with new routes towards 
locations within the traditional mining areas and outside (in the Eastern and Western Cape and KwaZulu−
Natal provinces).
These renewed patterns of migration are reshaping rural livelihoods as part of adaptation strategies 
to a liberalized context where informal and volatile labour conditions prevail. They result in increasing 
livelihoods’ differentiation in terms of income and activities, between migrants and non−migrant 
households – being the poorest – and between migrants.
4.2.3. Climate change: a misleading determinant but a complex driver of migration
In the international debate today, in a context where climate change receives a growing attention, climatic 
events are often pointed as a major determinant of migration. However, rural households’ situation with 
regard to climate change and its possible impact is highly differentiated. Variation mostly depends on 
their existing economic and social assets and on alternatives offered by their environment, which directly 
shape their vulnerability. Indeed, depending on their ability to migrate, rural households can be trapped 
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and face dire and worsening situations or, on the opposite, can start a new life elsewhere. Migration has 
been increasingly seen as an adaptive response to the impact of climate change, operating as a buffer 
and contributing to the resilience of the communities of origin.
The link between climate change and rural migration is complex. It is never unequivocal and several 
entangled and often self−reinforcing factors are at play. Forecasting rural migration patterns based on 
climate projections is therefore inaccurate. It often overlooks the complexity of processes and, in practice, 
it is the result of the combination of climatic events and other natural, social, political and economic 
factors that affects populations living in already vulnerable and fragile environments. 
This is the case of tropical regions, which are particularly vulnerable to climate impacts (IPCC, 2014), 
and when there is extensive reliance on climate sensitive livelihood activities. In SSA, rural communities 
still heavily depend on rain−fed crop production (they represent 96 percent of agricultural land in SSA) 
and on many extractive activities (hunting, fishing, and gathering) for food, water, and energy (wood and 
charcoal). The slow development of irrigation, the low adaptive capacity of existing farming systems, and 
the limited institutional capacity to design and implement effective adaptation measures exacerbate the 
over−reliance on natural factors. As such, climate change can foster food insecurity and SSA is one of 
the regions that would be the most severely hit (Schlenker and Lobell, 2010), with scenarios projecting 
a 20 percent increase of malnutrition incidence in 2050. However, food crises will likely result from a 
succession of shocks rather than isolated events and from coupling climatic and non−climatic factors. 
In SSA, vulnerability is of course exacerbated by poverty. The majority of rural people are poor; many 
are in extreme poverty, and their ability to cope with external shocks is limited by scarce or non−
existent possibilities for savings. While kinship and social networks could facilitate adaptation strategies 
– including migration – other factors such as low levels of education or limited access to assets and 
resources can act as barriers. Some regions of the continent are already facing critical environmental 
crises. These are places where land pressure is high (like the Ethiopian Highlands or the Great Lakes 
region) and where the vulnerability is also exacerbated by water shortages (e.g. Northern Nigeria, specific 
areas of Central Mali and Burkina Faso).
In countries where risk mitigation mechanisms are in place, people can be better equipped to prepare 
and cope with the adverse impacts of climate change. The adequate provision of private insurance and 
public goods (social protection) and the government’s capacity to answer to basic needs in the aftermath 
of natural disasters can help people to reconstruct their livelihoods and release pressure on the need to 
migrate. Similarly, preventive measures aiming at strengthening livelihoods resilience and reducing their 
sensitivity to climate variability could provide opportunities for people to thrive. 
Interventions to tackle the root causes of vulnerability spanning from building climate resilient 
infrastructures to boosting education and access to information could serve the double purpose of 
decreasing vulnerability as well as enhancing the positive impacts of migration for resilience building. In 
most SSA countries, issues such as political instability, bad governance, lack of capacities and limited 
financial resources prevent an effective use and implementation of similar mechanisms. 
Opposite to simplifying causalities, understanding how climate change interacts with other migration 
drivers appears as a first major step. It requires disentangling the complexity in order to design adaptation 
strategies that address the root causes of vulnerability and tackle the challenges of climate related 
migration. Prevention and adaptation finally require development strategies based on collective choices, 
grounded in possible and desirable visions of the future and possible scenarios. It calls for participatory 
processes for adequate and efficient design of public policies and implementation of multi− stakeholder 
actions.
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Conclusion
The aim of this working paper was to provide an up−to−date review of the literature examining the patterns 
and drivers of rural migration in Africa, to explore their relation to rural and structural transformation, and 
therefore feed the current policy debates on migration.
Migration is embedded in the process of structural transformation. Despite regional variation, historical 
evidence reminds how internal and international mobility of people goes hand in hand with productivity 
growth, the intersectoral transfer of labour and urbanization. Globally, people have been moving from 
rural areas to other places, generally cities and sometimes other countries.
Nowadays, the strength of urbanization and the opportunities of urban dynamics continue to fuel rural−
urban migration. However, this historical process is challenged. Worldwide, the systemic threats related 
to climate change and the depletion of natural resources – particularly fossil energy –question the urban 
growth model and its sustainability, notably related to the negative externalities of metropolization. In 
the specific context of sub−Saharan Africa, additional structural challenges result from the very unique 
demographic transition of the region, where population growth fuels massive job needs. This potential 
is confronted to low diversified economies where the lack of industrialization and the importance of 
the informal sector, offering many opportunities but with low returns and high vulnerability, limit the 
absorption capacity of cities and explains the difficulty of poverty alleviation. 
As a consequence of this very specific development path, new migration patterns have emerged over 
the last decades. Beyond the classical one−way rural−urban migration, contemporary African migration 
is characterised by multidirectional (including rural to rural and urban to rural), more complex and step-
wise movements with forms of circular migration that imply double−way, continuous relations of rural 
migrants with their areas of origin. 
These new patterns, by supporting socio-economic linkages within and across space and sectors, are 
challenging the conventional knowledge on the process of rural change. They reveal that migration is 
performing a range of socio economic functions far beyond the only transfer of labour from agriculture to 
others sectors and from rural to urban areas. As such, even if its contribution is most often overlooked, 
renewed migration dynamics can play a role in SSA structural transformation.
At individual, household and community levels, migration can contribute to rural livelihoods, providing 
pathways out of poverty, both for migrants and their families staying behind. The support of migrants 
through either social and cash remittances foster rural diversification with the development of on−farm, 
off−farm and non−farm activities. It reshapes the characteristics of rural households which are more 
diversified but also multi−located with members living and circulating between places. At the sub−
national or territorial level, in a context of increasing access to ICTs and improved transportation, African 
migration is at the core of new territorial dynamics with multiple and increased rural−urban linkages, 
contributing to blurring the old rural−urban divide. At the national level, even if their effects are embedded 
in many other macro−processes of change, migration likely contribute to socio−economic resilience, to 
entrepreneurship, and to economic growth through initiatives supported by remittances, new information 
and knowledge. 
The decision to migrate is complex and influenced by a myriad of interlinked factors. Considering the role 
of rural migration in SSA’s transformation process, it is crucial to better understand the mechanisms at 
play and this working paper helps to identify their drivers, their combination and their regional diversity.
Migration is often perceived as an erratic phenomenon largely driven by a desperate move to better−off 
cities in order to escape poverty, or by forced movement related to adverse local conditions. 
4. AnAlysing drivers of rurAl migrAtion: 
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This perception, which partly reflects the traditional “push−pull” model of migration, is insufficient to 
fully capture the complexity of migration in contemporary Africa. The paper highlights the ambivalent and 
complex relationships between poverty and migration and reminds the importance of agency, even when 
migrants face enormous constraints. It takes on board the role of “non−economic”, cultural, social and 
political factors, which not only shape the pattern and direction but also the characteristics of migration 
flows, including migrants’ profiles. 
Many migrants are not only “driven” by effective labour demand, but also by perceived economic 
opportunities and educational or socio−cultural motivations. Migrants have diverse socio economic profiles 
and different expectations, responding to diverse opportunities according to economic, political and cultural 
circumstances — changing over time, sometimes under the influence of migration itself. Considering this 
complexity, the drivers of migration do not work as independent forces. On the contrary, they operate in 
combination and are part of drivers complexes, which shape the specific form and structure of population 
movements. 
The complexity of rural migration and its role in development processes, which include differentiated 
outcomes, call for better policy design in order to build on or mitigate their positive or negative consequences. 
Public policies, by considering the many drivers of migration, can play a direct or indirect role in maximising 
the benefits and limiting the drawbacks of rural migration, both in places of origin and destination. 
Opposite to policy manoeuvring and instrumentality, a conducive approach first requires political 
commitment to look at migration as an opportunity. It can support and foster economic initiatives in the 
different regions of a country, and also in countries of destination when international migration is at play – 
which mostly means neighbouring countries in the case of SSA. 
It then needs to take on board the new rural−urban linkages and the related territorial dynamics underway 
supported by renewed migration patterns. Taking advantage of these new trends presents another 
opportunity for harnessing the potential of a more balanced territorial development. Analysing local assets 
and specific constraints is a major avenue for identifying adequate development strategies, and existing 
sectorial policies must be articulated into place−based, integrated territorial strategies – a new approach for 
development which is gaining momentum (TP4D, 2018). Public action can support private initiatives and the 
development of employment basins structured by networks of small towns articulated to their surrounding 
areas and hinterland. It can contribute to reduce the tensions associated to increasing metropolization. Such 
an approach using the full potential of African migration patterns must be supported by:
1. A significant improvement of the knowledge base in order to deal with the huge existing data gaps about 
migration and local dynamics. A better understanding is key to better policy making; 
2. A reinvestment in strategic thinking including agricultural development models and the respective 
roles of corporate investment and family farming, and their consequences on employment and rural 
livelihoods; 
3. A better understanding of environmental issues and pressure on natural resources with adequate policy 
frameworks to support and secure access to land and water;
4. An adequate provision of public goods and infrastructure to foster sectorial growth linkages between 
agriculture, rural non−farm activities and the development of small towns and provincial cities. 
Overall this approach must be consolidated by improved participation of local stakeholders, migrants, non−
migrant and migrant households, facilitated by information sharing and discussion of what could be the 
plausible futures of rural areas. It can definitely help to avoid marginalization and help rural migrants to 
decide why and where they will migrate, by choice and not by necessity.
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Annexes
Annex 1: Preliminary assessment of available relevant datasets on migration
Type of migration information included in the survey 
format
Notes
Survey/ source 
and type of 
access
Country (Years) Rural 
−urban: 
location of 
household 
(y/n)
Who  has 
migrated
(y/n)
Migration :
(0) no
(1) national
(2) 
international
(3) both
Reasons for 
migrating 
(y/n)
Activity at 
destination 
(y/n)
LSMS−ISA 
(Living 
standards 
measurement 
surveys−
Int Surv 
Agriculture)
8 countries
World Bank *
1. Burkina
Enquête multi−
sectorielle 
continue 2014
y y 3 y y
Information 
on 
outmigration 
is available 
for Ethiopia, 
Malawi, Mali, 
Niger and 
Nigeria.
2.Ethiopia  
Ethiopia Rural 
Socioeconomic 
Survey 2011−2012
Socioeconomic 
Survey 
2013−2014
Socioeconomic 
Survey 
2015−2016
y y 3 y y
3.Malawi
Third Integrated 
Household Survey 
2010−2011
Integrated 
Household Panel 
Survey 2013
Y 
but not 
explicit
Y Includes 
data on 
migrant 
children or 
spouse of 
the head 
of the 
household
3 y y
For Malawi 
and 
Tanzania, 
there is 
no direct 
indications 
regarding 
rural/
urban, but 
localisation 
code should 
allow to sort 
it.
4. Mali
Enquête Agricole 
de Conjoncture 
Intégrée aux 
conditions de 
vie des ménages 
2014
y y 3 y y
Missing 
values
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Type of migration information included in the survey format Notes
Survey/ source 
and type of 
access
Country (Years) Rural 
−urban: 
location of 
household 
(y/n)
Who  has 
migrated (y/n)
Migration :
(0) no
(1) national
(2) 
international
(3) both
Reasons 
for 
migrating 
(y/n)
Activity at 
destination 
(y/n)
5. Niger
Enquête Nationale 
sur les Conditions de 
Vie des Ménages et 
l’Agriculture 2011
Enquête Nationale 
sur les Conditions 
de Vie des Ménages 
et l’Agriculture2014
y y 3 y n
Accoding 
to available 
data, surveys 
in Mali and 
Niger have 
not collected 
done on out-
migration
6. Nigeria
General Household 
Survey 2010−2011 
General Household 
Survey 2012−2013 
General Household 
Survey 2015−2016
y y 3 y y
7. Tanzania
National Panel 
Survey 2008−2009 
National Panel 
Survey 2010−2011 
National Panel 
Survey 2012−2013
y 
but not 
explicitly
y 
(in−migration 
only)
3 
(in−migration 
only)
y
y 
(in−migration 
only)
For Tanzania 
and Uganda, 
migration 
information 
is available 
only about 
people 
who have 
returned 
to the 
household. 
8. Uganda
National Panel 
Survey 2009−2010 
National Panel 
Survey 2010−2011 
National Panel 
Survey 2011−2012 
National Panel 
Survey 2013−2014
y
y 
(in−migration 
only)
3 
(in−migration 
only)
y
y 
(in−migration 
only)
Concerns 
with quality 
of data and 
missing 
values.
LSMS (Living 
standards 
measurement 
surveys) 
World Bank *
Ghana 
Living Standard 
Survey (2013)
Not included in 
the LSMS−ISA 
project but detailed 
Information on out−
migration. 
y y 3 y y
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Type of migration information included in the survey 
format
Notes
Survey/ source 
and type of 
access
Country (Years) Rural 
−urban: 
location of 
household 
(y/n)
Who  has 
migrated 
(y/n)
Migration :
(0) no
(1) national
(2) 
international
(3) both
Reasons 
for 
migrating 
(y/n)
Activity at 
destination 
(y/n)
MRHS 
(Migration and 
Remittances 
Household 
Survey), World 
bank 
(7 countries)
1. Nigeria: 
Migration 
Household 
Survey, 2009
y
y 
(databases 
sparsely 
populated/ 
no 
response)
3 y
Y 
(databases 
sparsely 
populated/ 
no 
response)
2. Senegal: 
Migration and 
Remittances 
Household 
Survey, 2009
y y 3 y
3. Uganda: 
Migration 
Household 
Survey, 2010
Future of African 
Remittances: 
National 
Surveys, 2010
y y 3
4. Burkina Faso: 
Enquête Ménage 
sur la Migration 
et les Transferts 
de Fonds, 2010
y
5. Ethiopia:
Future of African 
Remittances: 
National Survey, 
2010
y
Different 
questionnaire
6. Kenya: 
Migration 
Household 
Survey, 2009; 
Future of African 
Remittances: 
National Survey, 
2010
y
7. South Africa: 
Migration and 
Household 
Survey, 2009
y
Not nationally 
representative
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Type of migration information included in the survey 
format
Notes
Survey/ 
source and 
type of access
Country (Years) Rural 
−urban: 
location of 
household 
(y/n)
Who  has 
migrated (y/n)
Migration :
(0) no
(1) national
(2) 
international
(3) both
Reasons 
for 
migrating 
(y/n)
Activity at 
destination 
(y/n)
LMM (Labour 
Migration 
Module) /
ILOSTAT **
ILO’s Labour Migration Module consists of a series of migration−related questions added to existing household 
and labour force surveys.  The module is a tool for gathering data on labour migration; the socio−demographic 
composition of labour migrants, including their educational attainment and areas of training before departure; as 
well as their economic activities, working conditions, and the frequency and duration of their travel. While module 
questions cover a wide range of migration topics, special attention is given to the employment situation of current 
and former migrants and to international remittances. Country priorities determine the choice of questions. 
For Africa, sections of the module were first tested in Egypt (2006/2007) and Zimbabwe (2011− 2012) 
ILO / Labour 
force surveys 
(LFS) 
30 SSA 
countries 
for different 
years
http://www.
ilo.org/dyn/
lfsurvey/
lfsurvey.home
Existing surveys realized between 2008 and 2014. Initial exploration for 2 countries reveal rural−urban 
disaggregated data exist on who has migrated, type and reason of migration as well as activity of migrant at 
destination
List of countries: Burkina Faso − Cameroon − Congo − Democratic Republic of Congo − Cote d’Ivoire − Egypt – 
Labour Force Survey (years not specified), Ethiopia – National Labour Force Survey 2013
Gabon − Gambia – The Gambia Labour Force Survey, April 2012; Ghana – Labour Force Survey 2015; Kenya – 
Economic Survey 1960−2016 ; Lesotho – Labour Force Survey 2008
Liberia – Labour Force Survey 2010 ; Madagascar −  Malawi − Malawi Labour Force Surver 2013 ; Mali; 
Mozambique;  Namibia – Labour Force Survey 2014 ; Nigeria – Labour Force Survey ; Rwanda – Labour Force 
Survey 2016 ; Senegal − Sierra Leone – Labour Force Survey 2014 ;  South Africa – Quarterly Labour Force Survey; 
Sudan – Labour Force Survey 2011;  Swaziland – Labour Force Survey ;Tanzania − 2005/06 − Integrated Labour 
Force Survey (ILFS)/ 2014 Integrated Labour Force Survey (ILFS); Uganda − The National Labour Force and Child 
Activities Survey 2011/12; Zambia – Labour Force Survey 2014; Zimbabwe –  Labour Force Survey 2014.
OECD 
Database on 
Immigrants 
in OECD and 
non OECD 
countries 
(DIOC−E) 
Includes 
17 African 
countries
An extension of DIOC 
to a number of non−
OECD countries for 
the year 2000/01 and 
2010/11. 
Provides 
comprehensive 
and comparative 
information on 
a broad range of 
demographic and 
labour market 
characteristics of 
immigrants living in 
OECD and part of non 
OECD countries.
n y 2 n y Interesting 
source 
especially 
for data on 
migration and 
education. 
There is no 
disaggregation 
for rural and 
urban
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Type of migration information included in the survey 
format
Notes
Survey/ source 
and type of 
access
Country (Years) Rural 
−urban: 
location of 
household 
(y/n)
Who  has 
migrated (y/n)
Migration :
(0) no
(1) national
(2) 
international
(3) both
Reasons 
for 
migrating 
(y/n)
Activity at 
destination 
(y/n)
ILO “School to 
work transition 
survey” ***
/8 African 
countries)
Include data on: Employed and unemployed youth that would consider moving (internal or international) by area 
of residence (rural−urban) and by sex; Employed youth who would consider moving by level of job satisfaction and 
area of residence (rural−urban).
Countries: Benin, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo Years: 
2012−2013/2014−2015
IMI/DEMIG 
project 
(Determinants 
of International 
Migration) 
30 African 
countries over 
different years
DEMIG Policy: tracks more than 6,500 migration policy changes enacted by 45 countries around the world mostly 
in the 1945−2013 period. The policy measures are coded according to the policy area and migrant group targeted, 
as well as the change in restrictiveness they introduce in the existing legal system. The dataset allows for both 
quantitative and qualitative research on the long−term evolution and effectiveness of migration policies. https://
www.imi.ox.ac.uk/data/demig−data/demig−policy−1
Morroco (since 1945); South Africa (Since 1900)
DEMIG TOTAL reports immigration, emigration and net migration flows for up to 161 countries 
covering various periods of time from the early 1800s to 2011, disaggregating total flows of 
citizens and foreigners whenever possible. The dataset allows for quantitative analysis of the 
long−term evolution of international migration. https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/data/demig−data/
demig−total−data
no 
disaggregation 
for rural and 
urban
Population 
Census 
Through Ipums 
initiative
The Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) try to harmonise and provide data on population. They are 
based on 10 percent random samples of national population censes conducted between 1990 and 2010. These 
nationally representative surveys have multiple waves for several African countries  and include migration and 
labour market information
Useful websites to access Census data:
https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
https://www.geog.leeds.ac.uk/research/csap/projects/image/
*Regarding LSMS−ISA surveys: Information provided in the table concerns the latest survey. 
The surveys include information on remittances, which indirectly can provide some complementary information 
about outmigration. This information is usually located in a financement/funding module.
For remittances, additional data source: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/
brief/migration−remittances−data 
**The ILO database on labour statistics (ILOSTAT) provides  statistics on international labour migration, which cover 
indicators on international migrant stock, international migrant flow and nationals abroad for selected ASEAN and 
Arab countries from 2001 to 2013. The data are in the form of cross−tabulations. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/
global/topics/labour−migration/policy−areas/statistics/lang−−en/index.htm
***Scool to Work Surveys : http://www.ilo.org/employment/areas/WCMS_234860/lang−−en/index.htm.
These household surveys of young people aged 15–29 years were conducted in 28 countries, with rural/urban 
distinctions available in 25 countries, between 2012 and 2013. The datasets (both in SPSS and STATA format) 
contain all individual variables plus three derived variables, “employment”, “unemployment” and “school enrolment”. 
For more information on derived variables, see methodology . To access data files: w4y@ilo.org 
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Annex 2: Missing values for selected variables in 6 countries
Percentages of missing data in the selected variables
Country Ethiopia Ghana Malawi Mali Nigeria Uganda
Variable Sample − Missing% Sample − Missing% Sample − Missing% Sample − Missing % Sample − Missing % Sample − Missing %
Brick walls 3,272                  0 9,327                 0 2,954                 0 2,399                 0 NA                   NA 2,302                 0
Own home 3,272                  0 9,327                 0 2,954                 0 2,399                 0 NA                   NA 2,302                 0
Non−dirt 
floor
3,272                  0 9,327                 0 2,954                 0 2,399                 0 NA                   NA 2,302                 0
Solid roof 3,272                  0 9,327                 0 2,954                 0 2,399                 0 NA                   NA 2,302                 0
electricity 3,272                  0 9,327                 0 2,954                 0 2,399                 0 3,299              0,45 2,302                 0,09
Safe water 3,272                  0 9,327                 0 2,954                 0 2,399                 0 3,299              0,45 2,302                 4,95
Toilet 3,272                  0 9,327                 0 2,954                 0 2,399                 0 3,299              0,45 2,302                 0
irrigation 3,272                  13,78 9,327                 18,26 2,954                 16,32 2,399                 11,95 3,299            23,86 2,302                 21,03
Large 
ruminant
3,272                  1,8 9,327                 35,71 2,954                 42,15 2,399                 22,09 3,299            16,55 2,302                 73,28
Rooms 3,272                  0 9,327                 0 2,954                 0 2,399                 0 NA                    NA 2,302                 0
Cell phone 3,272                  0 9,327                 10,61 2,954                 0 2,399                 0 3,299               0,45 2,302                 0
Highest 
education
3,272                  17,27 9,327                 10,64 2,954                 3,93 2,399                 66,19 3,299               1,27 2,302                 9,95
Hh size 3,272                  0 9,327                 0 2,954                 0 2,399                 0 3,299               0 2,302                 0
farm area 3,272                  2,29 9,327                 18,27 2,954                 14,15 2,399                 10,25 3,299             20,7 2,302                 8,91
Shocks 3,272                  0 NA                   NA 2,954                 0 2,399                 0 3,299                  0,45 2,302                 0,26
Market 3,272                  0 NA                   NA 2,954                 0 2,399                 0 3,299                 0,45 2,302                 0,26
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Variable Availability/Number of Missing Values
Ghana Ethiopia Malawi Mali Nigeria Uganda
Female headed household 0 n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. n.a.
Age of household head 0 n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. n.a.
Household size 0 0 0 0 0 0
Female share of household labor 0 0 0 0 39
(1,2%)
0
Highest years of education in 
household 
992
(10,6%)
565 116 1,558 42 229
Household experience of shocks n.a. 0 0 0 15 6
(0.03%)
Total land owned 3,962 
(42.5%)
0 0 453    
(18.0%)
668     
(20.2%)
0
Total livestock owned 0 356
(10,9%)
0 0 0 0
Household owns operating phone 990
(10,6%)
0 0 0 15
(0.5%)
0
Household has solid roof 0 0 0 0 NA 0
Male share of household labor 0 0 0 0 39
(10,6%)
0
Access to credit 0 0 0 0 0 NA
Farm area operated (in hectares) 1,704
(18.3%)
75
(2.3%)
418
(14.2%)
246
(10.3%)
683
(20.7%)
205
(8.9%)
Access to electricity 0 0 0 0 15
(0.5%)
0
Access to safe water 0 0 0 0 15
(0.5%)
114
(5.0%)
Access to toilet facility 0 0 0 0 15
(0.5%)
2
(0.1%)
Irrigation use 1703
(18.3%)
451
(13.9%)
482
(16.3%)
265
(11.0%)
787
(23.9%)
484
(21.0%)
Access to extension services NA 59
(1.8%)
188
(6.4%)
240
(10.0%)
531
(16.1%)
189
(8.2%)
Coverage of social assistance 0 0 0 0 0 NA
Main dwelling walls material – brick 0 0 0 0 NA 0
Dwelling has non−dirt/non−mud 
floor
0 0 0 0 NA 0
Household owns dwelling 0 0 0 0 NA 0
Raising livestock no land NA 506 1243 NA 668 190
Household owning equine 3331 59 1243 530 546 1687
Household owning poultry 3331 59 1243 530 546 1160
Household owning small 
ruminants
3331 59 1243 530 546 1175
Household owning large 
ruminants
3331 59 1243 530 546 1687
Number of rooms HH members 
occupy
0 0 0 0 NA 0
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Annex 3: Definition and measurement of variables for the binary logistic model
Variable 
type
Variable Definition and Description Household 
characteristics domain
Dependent Rural migrant 
householda
Dummy variable, where migrant−household=1 and 
non−migrant household=0
Independent Household size Discrete variable measured as the number of 
household members in the household at the time 
of the survey.
Demographic & Human 
capital
Female share of 
household labourb
Continuous variable measured as the proportion 
of female on the total number of household 
members at the time survey.
Highest years 
of education in 
household
Discrete variable measured as the highest number 
of schooling years of a household members at the 
time of the survey.
Household 
experience of 
shocks (weather, 
market and 
decease)
Dummy variable, where a household who 
experiences either weather, market or disease 
shocks is measured as 1 and 0 when the 
household does not experience any of these 
shocks at the time of the survey.
Shock & Extreme events
Total farmland 
owned
Continuous variable measured as the number of 
hectares of land that a household owns at the time 
of the survey.
Economic well−being
Total livestock 
owned
Discrete variable measured as the number of 
livestock of all types that a household owns at the 
time of the survey.
Household owns 
operating phone
Dummy variable, where a household with at 
least a member owning an operating cell phone 
is measured as 1 and 0 for households with no 
member owning an operating cell phone at the 
time of the survey.
Household has solid 
roof 
Dummy variable, where a household with a  decent 
roofing of their dwelling is measured as 1 and 0 for 
households with no decent or solid roofing of their 
dwelling unit at the time of the survey.
Social insurance Continuous variable measured as the value of 
social insurance benefit that the household 
received.
Electricity Dummy variable, where a household with a  
access to electricity is measured as 1 and 0 for 
households with no access to electricity to their 
dwelling unit at the time of the survey.
(a) RuLIS definition of migrants (variable at the household level): Dummy variable indicating whether at least one member of the 
household qualified as a migrant, either international or internal, during the 12 months prior to the interview. The definition of migrant is 
survey-specific.
(b) Existing literature point to the fact that migration is largely dominated by men, thus increase in female share of household labour 
might be indicative of more migration of men. In addition, for households with majority of their members being female, the pressure 
for a member to migrate (be it male or female) is high. As the regressions results showed, this was found to be a significant predictor of 
migration in Ethiopia and may be instructive for future research.
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Annex 4: Synthetic tables of the 37 future studies
Table 1. Characteristics of eight futures studies focusing on forecast
Reference Dimension Drivers Scale Pattern Relevance
Shaping the 
Future: A Long−
Term Perspective 
of People and Job 
Mobility for the 
Middle East and 
North Africa (WB, 
2009)
Social
Economic
Demographic trends in 
Europe and MENA Labor 
demand in Europe;
Labor supply in MENA. 
Cross−
regional 
(EU−MENA)
Different scenarios based on 
education profiles and labor 
force participation rates are 
used to assess the possibility 
to compensate for a 
European ageing population 
through migration from the 
MENA region. Migration 
of highly skilled people is 
favoured. Policies needed for 
the medium skilled people.
++
Megapatterns of 
global settlements  
(Valsson and 
Ulfarsson, 2012)
Economic 
Environmental
Technological
Spatial localization; 
Climate change, climate 
variability; 
Technological change; 
Scientific/ and technical 
innovation.
Global Migration towards the poles, 
towards coastal areas, 
towards central areas and 
along spatial population 
lines.
++
Migration pull 
factors in OECD 
(Lowell, 2009; 
OECD, 2009)
Economic 
Political
Social
Economic asymmetry, 
economic differential, 
economic gap; Labor 
market and search for 
jobs; Migration related 
policies; 
Demography; Education 
and training; Network; 
Social receptivity; Value 
systems.
Cross−
regional
Strong and permanent flow 
of mixed skilled migrants; 
Moderate permanent migra-
tion flow associated with 
active recruitment; Moderate 
and temporary migration 
flows of skilled migrants; 
Reduced flows of migration 
restricted to family, or even 
negative migration flows.
+
Forecasting 
World’s population 
(Bongaarts and 
Bulatao, 2000)
Economic
Political
Economic asymmetry, 
economic differential, 
economic gap; 
Globalization level; 
Economic demand, 
market and trade; 
Migration related 
policies.
Global Stable international migra-
tion towards traditional 
industrialized immigration 
countries, more unpredict-
able intra−regional migration 
towards existing and emerg-
ing/new poles of attraction.
+
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Reference Dimension Drivers Scale Pattern Relevance
FAO perspectives 
for 2050 on food 
and agriculture 
(Conforti, 2011)
Economic Population/resource 
ratio; Income per capita.
Global Outmigration from regions 
with low income per capita.
+
Sub−Saharan 
African migration: 
Patterns and 
Spillovers 
(Gonzalez−Garcia 
et al., 2016)
Economic
Social
Economic differential 
with developed 
countries;
Demography.
R e g i o n a l 
(SSA)
Projects larger migration flow 
due to demographic growth 
towards advanced economies. 
Predict 2,3 percent of OECD 
countries population are  mi-
grants from SSA in 2050.
+
Modeling internal 
migration flows 
in sub−Saharan 
Africa using census 
microdata (Garcia 
et al., 2015)
Economic
Social
Enviornmental
Active population;
Demography;
Distance; Rainfall
Sub−
Regional 
(10 SSA’ 
countries)
No specific patterns, but test 
the predictive capacity of 
different gravity−type spatial 
interaction models.
+−
2017 revision of 
the UN World 
Population 
Prospects 
(UNDESA, 2017)
Economic
Social 
Political
Economic asymmetry, 
economic differential, 
economic gap;  
Demography;  
Crises
Global International migration are 
due to large and persistent 
economic and demographic 
asymmetries between 
countries. Top net receivers 
of international migrants (> 
100,000/year) are the United 
States of America, Germany, 
Canada, the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, Australia and the 
Russian Federation. Coun-
tries with top net emigration 
(> 100,000/year) are India, 
Bangladesh, China, Paki-
stan, and Indonesia.
+−
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Reference Dimension Drivers Scale Pattern Relevance
Many more to 
come? Migration 
from and within 
Africa (EU/JRC, 
2018)
Economic 
Political 
Social 
Environmental
Demography;
Socio−economic 
development;
Climate change.
Regional 
(Africa)
Three scenarios:
Scenario 1: continuation of current 
socio−economic development, 
population growth, and migration 
intensity trends.
Scenario 2:  economic growth 
triggered by more direct 
investments, creation of 
employment in the formal 
economy, better access to 
education, faster decline in 
fertility rates.
Scenario 3: climate change 
producing extended heat waves, 
higher surface temperatures 
and disruptions in water cycles 
particularly affecting populated 
arid regions (Maghreb, Egypt, 
Sudan, parts of Southern Africa 
and the Big Lakes). 
++
Regional Migration 
Governance in the 
African Continent 
(Fioramonti and 
Nshimby, 2016)
Economic 
political
Nature of growth in 
Africa; 
Political system; 
Regional governance 
regimes.
Regional 
(Africa)
The role of internal economic 
drivers making “home” repulsive 
or attractive.
++
IIED−Africa’s 
Evolving Food 
Systems (Jayne et 
al., 2014)
Economic
Environmental 
Political 
Technological
Food and energy 
prices; The scope of 
urban income growth; 
Youth employment;
Climate change, 
climate variability; 
Soil quality; Migration 
and investment 
policies; Farm 
structure.
Regional 
(Africa)
4 scenarios. In the Latifundia 
scenario there is outmigration 
from rural areas experiencing land 
scarcity. Availability of unused 
land would favour voluntary rural−
rural migration.
++
Global migration 
futures: Using 
scenarios to explore 
future migration in 
the Horn of Africa & 
Yemen ((RMMS and 
IMI, 2012)
Economic 
Political
Economic growth; 
Capacity of the state; 
Military conflict
Regional 
(Horn of 
Africa  & 
Yemen)
The Cash Baby! scenario induces 
large internal rural to urban 
migration of subsistence farmers 
and pastoralist and external 
migration of refugees and 
displaced people. International 
migration concerns students and 
skilled people and become more 
circular (intraregional migration). 
The Jigsaw puzzle scenario 
induces a migration pattern with 
both flows of in−migrants to a 
more stabilized region as well as 
emigration of a diversity of people 
to a diversity of destinations.
++
Table 2 Characteristics of 17 futures studies focusing on foresight 
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Reference Dimension Drivers Scale Pattern Relevance
The Future of 
International 
Migration to OECD 
Countries (di Mattia 
and Cassan, 2009; 
OECD, 2009; Talwar, 
2009)
Economic 
Political 
Social
Income inequalities in 
non OECD countries; 
Growth level in OECD 
countries:
Global Governance, 
institutional and socio−
political frameworks, 
Geopolitical factors;
Demography; 
Education and training; 
Network; Social 
development level in 
the countries of origin.
Cross−
regional
Five scenarios: Progress for 
All; OECD Long Boom; Uneven 
Progress; Globalisation Falters; 
Decoupled Destinies. Each 
scenario is associated with 
different migration patterns
++
International 
migration study 
(OECD, 2016a)
Economic 
Political
Economic 
asymmetry, 
economic differential, 
economic gap; 
Global Governance, 
institutional and 
socio−political 
frameworks, 
geopolitical factors; 
Migration related 
policies.
Global 4 scenarios: Slower shifting 
wealth; SDG success; Crisis 
with attempt for co−operation; 
Rapid automation and conflicts. 
Each scenario lead to a differ-
ent migratory pattern.
+
Territorial 
foresight in Mali 
and Madagascar 
(Bourgeois et al., 
2016b, 2016a)
Economic
Environmental 
Political 
Social
Informal sector; 
Infrastructure 
development; Local 
investment; Energy 
(access); Policy 
orientation; Local 
capacity of actors; 
Security.
Intra−
national
No specific patterns. +
The future of 
poverty and 
development 
in Africa 
(Ohiorhenuan, 2011)
Economic 
Political
Competitiveness; 
Governance.
Regional 
(Africa)
Four scenarios. No clear 
migration pattern.
+
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Reference Dimension Drivers Scale Pattern Relevance
Migration 
and Global 
Environmental 
Change Future 
Challenges and 
Opportunities 
Future Scenarios. 
(Government 
Office for 
Science, 2011)
Economic
Political
World growth rate;
Local governance
Global 4 scenarios crossing growth 
(high/low) X governance 
(exclusive/inclusive): High/
exclusive: ‘gradual’ or ‘routine’ 
migration to richer economies 
towards regional economic 
growth poles. Increased 
irregular migration by those 
with assets and capitals, mainly 
international migration. High/
inclusive: voluntary migration 
to richer economies towards 
regional economic growth poles; 
Facilitated circulation of migrant 
populations, secure channels 
for transmission of remittances 
and diaspora involvement 
in economic and political 
development. Low/exclusive: 
More skilled populations from 
poorer countries relocate to 
richer economies, limited internal 
migration of skilled workers 
in urban centres of poorer 
economies; Increased irregular 
migration by those with assets 
and capital. Low/inclusive: 
Low demand for international 
migrants, substantial internal 
migration to areas of higher 
growth (regional growth poles,  
coastal areas).
+
Future 
Agriculture – 
livestock, crops 
and land use” 
(Öborn et al., 
2011)
Economic
Environmental 
Political
Labor; 
Climate change, 
climate variability; 
Migration related 
policies.
Global Three patterns resulting from 
different migration flows: 
concentration of large cities, 
growth of town centres and 
developed rural areas.
+
Millenium 
economic 
assessment 
Order from 
Strength scenario 
(Reilly and 
Willenbockel, 
2010)
Economic 
Technical 
Environmental
Level of Food 
insecurity; 
Level of farm outputs; 
Climate change, 
climate variability
Global/ 
regional
Mass migration from southern to 
West and East Africa.
+
MedAction 
European project 
(Kok et al., 2006)
Environmental 
Technological
Water; 
ICT; Technological 
change; Scientific and 
technical innovation.
Cross−
regional
Migration flows increase in all 
scenarios at different paces; 
Water situation is a push of pull 
factor.
+
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Reference Dimension Drivers Scale Pattern Relevance
Foresighting food, 
rural and agrifutures 
and (SCAR−CWG, 
2007)
Environmental Climate change, 
climate variability; 
Energy; Water
Global Migration out of regions prone 
to repeated climate shocks.
+
Alternatives futures 
for global food and 
agriculture (OECD, 
2016b)
Political
Social 
Technological
International 
cooperation; 
Attitudes towards 
sustainable 
behaviors; 
Technological 
innovation.
Global 3 scenarios:  Individual, Fossil 
Fuel−Driven Growth Citizen−
Driven, Sustainable Growth; 
Fast, Globally−Driven Growth. 
A stronger flow of labour out 
of agriculture−related sectors 
in the “Fast scenario” with 
workers moving to other 
manufacturing and service 
sectors. These flows are 
considered to be smaller in 
the “Individual scenario”.
+−
Future change and 
policy responses 
for EU food safety 
and security (Food 
Chain Evaluation 
Consortium, 2014)
Environmental Climate change, 
climate variability.
Regional 
(EU)
“Environmental migration”. +−
African Futures 
2050 The next forty 
years (Cilliers et al., 
2011)
Economic
Social
Political
Environmental
Economic growth; 
Agriculture;
Demography;
Governance;
Natural resources
Regional 
(Africa)
Four alternative African 
futures crossing global 
context (friendly vs harsh) and 
African governance (weak/
parasitic vs development 
focused): Opportunities lost; 
Politics of the belly; Arrested 
development; African 
renaissance. Only patter of 
migration is associated with 
climate change.
+−
GEO 4  Global 
Environment 
Outlook (Martino 
and Zommers, 
2007)
Economic
Social
Political
Technological
Globalization; 
Global Governance, 
institutional and 
socio−political 
frameworks, 
geopolitical 
factors  (including 
international 
migration policies) 
Demography; 
Social receptivity; 
Value systems; 
Technological 
change; Scientific 
and technical 
innovation.
Global Migration due to conflict and 
environmental degradation or 
extreme climatic events, such 
as out−migration of people 
depending on endangered 
ecosystems, from coastal 
areas due to the rise of sea 
level.
+−
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Table 3. Characteristics of 12 other analytical futures studies
Reference Dimension Drivers Scale Pattern Relevance
African migration: 
trends, patterns, 
drivers (Flahaux 
and De Haas, 
2016)
Economic
Political
Development 
level; 
National 
migration 
policies.
Regional 
(Africa)
Does not include future 
patterns but indicates trends 
such as: More long−distance 
international migration 
from countries with higher 
development level; More short−
distance regional migration from 
countries with low development 
levels.
++
Connecting with 
migrant: a global 
diaspora profile 
(OECD, 2012)
Economic
Political
Social
Employment 
attractiveness 
differential; 
Migration 
policies; 
Historical, 
colonial, 
linguistic links
Global Out−migration from SSA to 
Europe of educated workers but 
also limits due to immigration 
policies associated with 
growing flows of “south−south” 
migration in Africa. Countries 
with higher growth rate such 
as Botswana, Namibia, South 
Africa or Gabon could become 
attractive for more educated 
people.
++
Sub−Saharan 
African 
urbanization and 
global climate 
change (Parnell 
and Walawege, 
2011)
Social Natural 
population 
growth in cities
Regional 
(SSA)
Natural population growth in the 
cities is more important than 
climate change to explain future 
settlement patterns in Africa.
++
Trends and 
dynamics of 
international 
migration in 
Western Africa 
(Bossard and 
Trémolières, 2010)
Environmental
Social
Climate 
change;  
Natural 
resources
Demography. 
Regional 
(west 
Africa)
Continued growth of 
international migration fuelled 
by SSA.
++
Drivers of change 
in agriculture 
(Hazell and Wood, 
2008)
Economic
Political
Social
Employment 
attractiveness 
differential; 
War and 
conflicts.
Global 2 types of migration: a rural−
urban migration determined by 
a “pull−out of agriculture” factor 
due to the attractiveness of 
better jobs in richer and growing 
economies, and a distress 
migration where households 
compensate declining income 
with jobs in other low−income 
activities.
++
Issues and trends 
in international 
migration in sub−
Saharan Africa 
(Adepoju, 2010)
Economic
Political
Social
Economic 
situation; 
Employment 
Political 
situation; 
Inequality and 
poverty.
Regional 
(SSA)
Flow of legal and illegal 
migrants.
+
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Reference Dimension Drivers Scale Pattern Relevance
The future of food 
and agriculture 
− Trends and 
challenges (FAO, 
2017)
Economic
Social 
Political
Environmental
Employment 
opportunities; 
Demography 
(population 
growth); 
Conflicts and 
crises; 
Climate 
change.
Global No migration scenarios, 
but two migration patterns: 
Distress migration due to 
a combination of natural 
disasters due to adverse 
effects of climate change 
and conflicts; Non−distress 
migration due to the 
differential in employment 
opportunities and socio−
economic conditions.
+−
The future of 
sustainability 
and food and 
agriculture 
(Giovannucci et al., 
2012)
Environmental 
Technological
Land; Water; 
Farm structure.
Global Rural migration from places 
facing water scarcity, 
pressure on land and 
farming structures reducing 
local employment.
+−
The Big Picture 
(Saritas and Smith, 
2011)
Environmental Climate change Global No specific pattern. +−
Impact of IT 
on migration 
intentions in rural 
communities 
(Moon et al., 2010)
Technological Digital gap 
between rural 
and urban 
areas
National 
(Korea)
The IT gap determines rural 
to urban flows.
+−
Foresight for smart 
globalization 
(Jhirad et al., 
2009)
Economic 
Environmental 
Political
Economic 
inequality; 
State of 
ecosystems; 
Geopolitical 
relationships.
Global Rural to urban migration. +−
Challenges for 
Africa−Europe 
relations − A 
chance to get it 
right (Mackie et 
al., 2018)
Not specified Not specified Inter−
regional 
(Africa − 
Europe)
No pattern analysis. It 
discusses the place of 
migration in future Africa−
Europe relationship.
+−
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Annex 5: Plausible scenarios for rural migration based on future states of rural areas and 
global alternative futures
The figure below displays the seven scenarios elaborated by Bourgeois (2015) about plausible 
rural transformation scenarios along two axes, combining respectively the level of investment 
in rural areas (vertical axis) and the relation between food consumption and food production 
patterns (horizontal axis).
Source: Complete picture from Bourgeois (2015). What Future for Rural Areas? Seven plausible rural 
transformations.
Photographs:
Rural poles: ©East of England Broadband Network (E2BN); Rural continuums: ©Antoine Berger; Rural 
Niches: © Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System; Rural stations: ©Farms Not Factories; 
Farming cities: ©Chris Jacobs; Rural Ghettos: ©Mercopress; Peri- and Urban farming: ©Alva Lim. 
The table below displays the drivers of each scenario, the details of each scenario, and where 
they could take place in sub−Saharan Africa:
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Drivers  Scenarios Where in sub−Saharan Africa
Consumers’ preferences for 
food price above food quality 
and safety; Globalization of 
food trade; Concentration and 
vertical integration of food chains; 
Automation of production; Land 
availability.
Rural stations. Gigantic automated 
agri−plants employ a limited number 
of workers, unless local poverty 
makes human labour cheaper. Highly 
specialized, spatially isolated, hyper−
connected to markets through roads, 
railways, air and maritime freight, and 
ICT.
Not very suited for SSA, possibly 
Namibia; mostly in large and 
less populated areas in parts 
of South America, Canada and 
United States of America, Eastern 
Europe, Caucasus, Russian 
Federation, Australia, and 
mainland China.
Preference for urban life; Public 
investment in urban areas; 
Technological breakthrough; High 
tech connectivity.
Farming cities. High−tech 
“agriculture” develops in highly 
controlled environments. City agri−
buildings owned by municipalities or 
private companies employ technicians 
and produce a diversity of products.
In densely populated areas of 
more developed countries and as 
part of all mega−cities 
Urbanization; Preferences for 
urban lifestyles; Demand for 
diversified food products; Failure 
of outsourcing food products; 
Local culinary preferences; Lack of 
public investment in remote rural 
areas.
Urban farming. City residents use 
all available interstitial urban spaces 
(wasteland, buildings, walls, roofs, 
terraces…) to grow a diversity of 
products. They are connected to 
specific consumers through local 
short segmented chains.
In and around mega−cities 
particularly in highly populated 
emerging and developing 
countries. 
High−income consumers 
preference for certified, high value 
products, grown in specific areas; 
Increased connectivity or proximity 
between specialized producers 
and specific consumers; Targeted 
public and private investment.
Rural niches. People find livelihood in 
exploiting a comparative advantage 
offered by local features in and 
outside agriculture. Rural niches 
attract private and public investment 
targeting specific market segments 
producing high quality, high added−
value products.
In the most developed rural areas 
where local resources make 
the production of high quality 
specialized products possible.
Diversion of public and private 
investment to cities; Natural, 
social, economic, and health 
disasters; Remoteness of rural 
areas; Misery of urban life for the 
jobless.
Rural ghettos. A marginalized 
population survive through self−
subsistence in abandoned rural areas. 
They seek employment in gigantic 
agro−industries (rural stations) around 
which they settle or through migration 
of family members.
In deeply rural areas, 
mountainous areas and in the 
vicinity of rural stations; also 
where land concentration will 
deprive people for the possibility 
to properly settle.
Limited globalization with 
restricted free flow of products; 
Standardization of consumers’ 
preferences; Risk sharing 
strategies of agri−food chains; 
Selective public investment in rural 
infrastructure where immediate 
returns can be yielded.
Rural poles large−scale core 
industries transforming a limited 
number of key products (tree crops, 
grains, meat, but also non−food 
products) and limiting production 
risks by contracting production to a 
plasma or clusters of smaller farms 
or households supplying the core 
industry.
In the hinterlands between cities 
and deeper rural areas, where 
land is available and population 
density not too high.
Shift of consumers preference 
towards local products; 
Technological breakthroughs 
for more resilient yet profitable 
farming systems; Public and 
private investment in rural areas in 
and outside agriculture; Failure of 
globalisation to satisfy a diversified 
demand; Direct connectivity 
of producers and consumers; 
Individual aspirations and 
worldviews.
Continuous food production and 
transformation, and many non−
farm activities take place in small 
diversified enterprises that are highly 
connected to local markets and 
operate in an environment providing 
connectivity and employment 
opportunities. “Farmers” have several 
jobs and are directly connected to 
markets and consumers. Quality of 
life is similar to that of urban areas.
In moderately dense areas around 
small to medium size cities.
Source: Adapted from (Bourgeois, 2015)
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The next table displays correspondences between three of Dator’s world orders (Dator, 2009) presented in 
section 2.2 and the plausible future states of rural areas presented above:
Scenarios of rural transformation
Rural 
stations
Farming 
cities
Urban 
farming
Rural 
niches
Rural 
ghettos
Rural 
poles
Rural 
Continuums
Continued 
Growth
xxx xxx xxx   xxx  
Discipline   xxx    xxx
Collapse   xxx xxx xxx   
This articulation allows the development of a narrative for each scenario: 
Narrative 1: Continued growth. A pattern similar to the trend observed so far takes place, with identical pull 
and push factors. As urbanization develops, and agricultural production gets more concentrated in large 
capital intensive/robotized production systems, agro−industrial clusters, and farming cities, rural people 
will tend to migrate more and more towards larger cities within their own countries, developing peri−urban 
farming, or towards more developed countries in their region/world (United States of America, Canada, 
Europe, Middle East, Australia). However, SSA international rural migrants would have to compete with other 
non−rural and rural migrants particularly from Asia. The poorest rural migrants will not be in a situation to 
compete with non−rural migrants, and preferential immigration policies in receiving countries shaped by job 
requirements as well as local social and cultural acceptability will also limit the out−migration options for 
rural people. As a result, many of them would live in rural ghettos in marginal rural areas or at the periphery 
of medium and large cities. 
Narrative 2: Discipline. The refocusing of the economy and society on survival and fair distribution leads to 
the rehabilitation of rural areas as places providing possibilities for decent living conditions. SSA rural out−
migration are limited as the living conditions offered in rural areas are not significantly less attractive than 
in urban areas and sometime the difference is no longer visible (rural continuums, farming cities).  SSA rural 
migrants migrate by choice and personal preferences. There is no competition for outmigration. 
Narrative 3: Collapse. This world order would trigger massive worldwide migration of the most vulnerable 
people (from Asia and Africa mainly) from the worst hit places of collapse towards safer places. Tens of 
millions of Asian migrants and African urban migrants would compete with SSA rural migrants. In this 
scenario, the best chances for potential SSA rural migrants would not be to migrate but to develop local 
survival strategies based on autarchy and subsistence farming (rural oasis).
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Annex 6: Additional definitions
Circular migration refers to recurrent movements between a place of origin and one or more places of 
destination, which involves more than one migration and return. In this respect, circular migration contrasts 
with conventional and statistical definitions of migration that consider a permanent change of residence 
related to a definitive or long term movement between origin and destination. It also differs from return 
migration and from commuting. Circular migration involves migrants sharing work, family and other aspects 
of their lives between two or more locations. It can occur at both internal and international levels (Graem, 
2013).
Internally displaced person (IDP): Persons or groups who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their 
homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human−made disasters, 
and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (UNCHR, 1998). 
International migration refers to movement of persons who leave their country of origin, or country of 
habitual residence, to establish themselves either permanently or temporarily (usually for over than 1 year) 
in another country. An international frontier is therefore crossed (IOM, 2011).
Internal migration refers to a movement of people from one area of a country to another area of the same 
country for the purpose or with the effect of establishing a new residence. This migration may be temporary 
or permanent. Internal migration includes: (i) rural to urban migration; (ii) rural to rural migration; (iii) urban 
to rural migration; and (iv) urban to urban migration (IOM, 2011).
Migrant. The term migrant is defined by (IOM) as “any person who is moving or has moved across an 
international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the 
person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the 
movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is”. Migration is therefore the movement of a person or 
a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a state. This may encompass any kind 
of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes, including the migration of refugees, 
displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, and family reunification 
(IOM, 2011). However, there is no universal categorization of migrants, as each country has its own policies, 
legislation and statistics regarding migration. 
Migration pattern. A migration pattern is a combination of features of migration (spatial scale, duration, 
volume, intensity, and direction) that endure through time and space, characterizing migration flows with 
a specific form and structure. Migration patterns can be related to specific groups of people (in terms of 
socioeconomic features) resulting in particular organizations (networks, associations, brotherhoods).
Refugee: Refugee According to the 1951 Refugee Convention (Article 1(A)(2)), a refugee is a person who is 
outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection 
of that country, because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinions (IOM 2011 and UNHCR | Glossary).
Rural and urban areas. No agreed definition exists. Most of the time, rural areas are defined in opposition 
to urban areas, and the definition of urban areas varies between countries, depending on size, functions, 
administrative status, etc. (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, 2015). Beyond the difficulty to set a standard definition, the 
idea of a clear division between an urban and a rural area misshapes the reality of what rural, urban, growing 
peri−urban and “rurban” areas are today. Remote rural areas still exist, particularly in SSA, but generally 
the improved access to ICTs, information, and to transportation networks, as well as better educational 
standards foster the movement of people, blurring the limits of the old rural – urban divide (Losch, 2015). 
Changing settlements, more integrated food systems, commuting and migration patterns and new lifestyles 
contribute to an interface where often population and activities cannot anymore be spatially categorised in 
a strict manner.
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Annex 7: Rural MHH and NMHH profiles: summary statistics for selected variables
Variable
RULIS Selected Countries
Ghana Ethiopia Malawi
MHHs NMHHs t/chi²
tests
MHHs NMHHs t/chi²
tests
MHHs NMHHs t/chi²
tests
Highest years of 
education in household 
(years)
9.9 8.1 −10.66** 4.6 4.0 −4.47** 9.4 7.4 −11.23**
Female share of 
household labor (%)
0.53 0.48 −2.46* 0.53 0.50 −2.01* 0.54 0.52 −1.75
Household size (number 
of household members)
6.3 4.4 −13.59** 5.1 5.3 0.35 4.5 4.9 3.36**
Size of land owned (in 
ha)
3.21 2.62 −3.13** 1.43 1.16 −4.06** 0.34 0.52 6.16**
Total livestock owned 
(heads)
2.0 1.0 −4.99** 3.4 3.0 −2.25* 0.2 0.3 2.39*
Age of the head of the 
household (in years)
49.4 46.8 −3.43** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
household owns cell 
phone (Yes)
96.4% 93.8% 0.54 52.2% 37.9% 31.81** 60.1% 37.4% 66.12**
Solid roof (Yes) 82.4% 82.8% 0.44 64.9% 50.8% 28.99** 43.1% 30.8% 31.11**
Female−headed 
household (Yes)
20.8% 26.4% 5.98* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Household experienced 
weather, market or 
disease related shocks 
(Yes)
n.a. n.a. n.a. 37.7% 48.7% 9.70** 80.0% 91.3% 49.93**
Male share of household 
labor 
0.47 0.44 −2.46* 0.44 0.43 −0.68 0.45 0.44 −0.89
Farm area operated 
(in ha)
3.3 2.6 −5.48** 1.4 1.2 −3.35** 0.71 0.73 0.41
Coverage of social 
assistance (Yes)
1.1% 0.7% 1.49 25.2% 24.8% 0.07 20.7% 28.6% 9.1**
Access to extension 
services (Yes)
n.a. n.a. n.a. 67.0% 60.9% 11.07** 45.6% 46.3% 0.05
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Variable Mali Nigeria Uganda
MHHs NMHHs t/chi²
tests
MHHs NMHHs t/chi²
tests
MHHs NMHHs t/chi²
tests
Highest years of 
education in household 
(years)
8.4 6.2 −1.14 9.2 7.94 −4.71** 7.7 7.3 −1.06
Female share of 
household labor (%)
0.51 0.53 2.07* 0.53 0.51 −1.56 0.48 0.50 0.60
Household size (number 
of household members)
15.0 10.6 −6.67** 7.1 6.3 −4.93** 7.5 5.6 −5.05**
Size of land owned (in ha) 7.7 5.6 −3.17** 0.33 0.50 4.55** 0.32 0.40 1.08
Total livestock owned 
(heads)
3.4 3.5 −0.23 0.4 1.2 3.68** 1.4 0.8 −3.47**
Age of the head of the 
household (in years)
54.0 50.4 −1.95 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
household owns cell 
phone (Yes)
92.2% 73.4% 14.54** 85.4% 70.1% 31.11** 71.9% 64.0% 1.75
Solid roof (Yes) 46.7% 35.3% 0.24 n.a. n.a. n.a. 77.1% 65.9% 3.78
Female−headed 
household (Yes)
0.5% 3.5% 10.06** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Household experienced 
weather, market or 
disease related shocks 
(Yes)
67.7% 69.1% 5.72* 17.2% 21.8% 10.69** 44.6% 37.1% 1.81
Male share of household 
labor 
0.49 0.46 −2.33* 0.41 0.42 1.14 0.50 0.43 −1.86
Farm area operated 
(in ha)
7.4 5.8 −3.04** 0.65 0.90 3.18** 1.9 2.0 0.45
Coverage of social 
assistance (Yes)
24.1% 15.8% 8.76** 1.3% 3.2% 3.77 na na na
Access to extension 
services (Yes)
21.6% 27.6% 3.08 1.1% 6.0% 11.15** 26.6% 20.4% 1.47
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Variable
RULIS Selected Countries
Ghana Ethiopia Malawi
MHHs NMHHs t/chi²
tests
MHHs NMHHs t/chi²
tests
MHHs NMHHs t/chi²
tests
Access to irrigation 
services (Yes)
1.5% 0.77% 2.66 11.9% 10.6% 1.07 2.1% 1.8% 0.10
Access to improved 
sanitation (Yes)
26.2% 30.0% 3.39 63.6% 59.9% 4.12* 75.1% 66.0% 11.0**
Access to safe 
water (Yes)
61.4% 57.5% 3.16 72.8% 71.7% 0.40 24.6% 18.1% 8.16**
Access to 
electricity (Yes)
41.4% 41.0% 0.02 34.0% 28.5% 10.0** 14.7% 3.3% 88.56**
Household 
obtaining credit 
(Yes)
16.7% 10.3% 21.20** 24.8% 24.4% 0.05 24.9% 20.0% 4.26*
Main dwelling walls 
material – brick 
(Yes)
28.8% 32.2% 2.68 0.9% 0.9% 0.02 87.1% 77.7% 15.62**
Dwelling has non−
dirt/non−mud floor 
(Yes)
81.8% 83.2% 0.66 4.3% 4.8% 0.32 37.5% 19.4% 57.84**
Household owns 
dwelling (Yes)
84.1% 75.9% 18.63** 93.6% 92.0% 2.59 54.7% 87.3% 228.85**
Raising livestock no 
land (Yes)
n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.4% 7.5% 1.09 20.1% 5.7% 46.21**
Household owning 
equine (Yes)
9.1% 6.6% 3.77 41.8% 35.2% 13.27** 0.0% 0.1% 0.10
Household owning 
poultry (Yes)
86.6% 86.4% 0.01 54.8% 50.5% 5.02* 81.8% 79.9% 0.30
Household owning 
small ruminants 
(Yes)
71.6% 65.8% 5.78* 58.5% 53.6% 6.52* 40.0% 45.7% 2.60
Household owning 
large ruminants 
(Yes)
20.5% 17.3% 2.90 75.6% 72.7% 3.01 6.9% 11.8% 3.42
Number of 
rooms household 
members occupy
2.7 2.1 −8.90** 1.8 1.7 −4.56** 2.3 2.2 −0.68
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Variable Mali Nigeria Uganda
MHHs NMHHs t/chi²
tests
MHHs NMHHs t/chi²
tests
MHHs NMHHs t/chi²
tests
Access to irrigation 
services (Yes)
12.8% 21.1% 7.08** 0.0% 1.5% 3.66 5.6% 1.6% 4.92*
Access to improved 
sanitation (Yes)
87.4% 84.1% 6.12* 10.8% 5.6% 13.33** 87.1% 72.8% 7.12**
Access to safe 
water (Yes)
34.0% 43.0% 5.83* 61.4% 59.7% 0.33 81.8% 69.3% 4.73*
Access to 
electricity (Yes)
4.2% 4.4% 0.02 42.4% 35.3% 6.24* 1.4% 3.0% 0.59
Household 
obtaining credit 
(Yes)
29.3% 24.7% 2.01 8.5% 4.2% 12.34** n.a. n.a. n.a.
Main dwelling walls 
material – brick 
(Yes)
10.0% 9.4% 0.07 n.a. n.a. n.a. 70.0% 59.9% 2.91
Dwelling has non−
dirt/non−mud floor 
(Yes)
16.8% 14.3% 0.85 n.a. n.a. n.a. 19.2% 26.5% 5.57*
Household owns 
dwelling (Yes)
94.2% 89.5% 4.35* n.a. n.a. n.a. 90.8% 71.3% 66.45**
Raising livestock no 
land (Yes)
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0% 0.3% 0.89 1.6% 0.8% 0.47
Household owning 
equine (Yes)
74.7% 66.6% 4.52* 0.0% 2.9% 8.09** 0.0% 0.3% 0.10
Household owning 
poultry (Yes)
77.1% 63.7% 11.92** 47.0% 47.2% 0.00 97.8% 99.9% 11.23**
Household owning 
small ruminants 
(Yes)
83.1% 80.5% 0.67 40.3% 52.1% 13.51** 100% 100% −
Household owning 
large ruminants 
(Yes)
76.5% 70.5% 2.68 3.7% 21.4% 47.81** 96.7% 99.8% 8.80**
Number of 
rooms household 
members occupy
6.2 5.5 −2.26* n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.9 2.3 −4.33**
Source: Authors’ own computations based on RuLIS data.  Note: MHHs and NMHHs stand for Migrant 
Households and Non−Migrant Households respectively.  **Significant at the 1% level. *Significant at the 
5% level
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Annex 8: Results from PCA (factor scores for first component)
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